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ENTERPRISE LIABILITY AND THE






“Enterprise medical liability” is a term used to describe a system in which
health care organizations bear responsibility for medical malpractice in
addition to or instead of individual health professionals.1  Enterprise liability is
in many senses a natural outgrowth of the increasing dependence of medical
practice on institutional resources and expertise.2  Proposals for enterprise
liability surfaced briefly from the academic literature into the political spotlight
during the 1993-94 health care reform debate.  At that time, objections to the
concept as a basis for medical malpractice liability, even in a restructured
health care system, were nearly universal.
Just five years later, many of the groups vehemently opposing the Clinton
malpractice reform have become vigorous supporters of managed care
liability.3  Moreover, courts and legislatures are holding managed care
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1. Several articles have been written about enterprise liability since the demise of the Clinton
health plan.  See Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the
Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 HARV. L. REV. 381 (1994); Barry R. Furrow,
Enterprise Liability and Health Care Reform: Managing Care and Managing Risk, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
77 (1994); Clark C. Havighurst, Making Health Plans Accountable for the Quality of Care, 31 GA. L.
REV. 587 (1997); William M. Sage et al., Enterprise Liability for Medical Malpractice and Health Care
Quality Improvement, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 1 (1994).
2. Other professions are also having to deal with the complexity of modern practice and the
potential for institutional responsibility.  In law, for example, New York recently became the first state
to impose professional disciplinary rules on law firms in addition to individual lawyers.  See N.Y.
DISCIPLINARY RULES 1-102, 1-103, 1-105 (amended May 22, 1996).  The New York rules codify a
judicial decision in favor of an attorney who had been discharged by his law firm for insisting that the
firm divulge the misconduct of an associate.  The Court of Appeals held that there exists an unstated
but essential compact intrinsic to the relationship between an attorney and a law firm that both will
conduct legal practice in compliance with rules of conduct and professional ethical standards.  See
Weider v. Skala, 80 N.Y.2d 628, 637 (N.Y. 1992).
3. These interest groups, including the American Medical Association (“AMA”), do not
generally acknowledge that their current lobbying efforts bear any resemblance to the much-deplored
Clinton version of enterprise liability.  On occasion, contemporary concepts are qualified in some
respect to differentiate them from the Clinton proposal.  More frequently, the connection is simply
ignored (and perhaps unnoticed), obvious as it may seem.
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organizations accountable for malpractice in ways superficially compatible with
the Clinton proposal.  In the process, however, enterprise liability has been
transformed from a theory without a movement to a movement without a
theory.  This article explores why this happened, whether it is likely to be a
transitory phase or a sustained trend, and what it portends for the public policy
objectives of medical tort law.
Part II of this article describes the theoretical justifications for imposing
liability for medical malpractice on managed care organizations, emphasizing
proposals that were made in connection with the national health care reform
debate.  Part III explains why enterprise liability failed to attract support in
1993-94.  Part IV discusses the very different attitudes that prevail in 1998, and
details the legal manifestations of the current movement to expand malpractice
liability in managed care.  Parts V and VI of the article analyze the relationship
among theoretical constructs of enterprise liability, the reality of today’s
managed care marketplace, and the legal response managed care has provoked.
Specifically, Part V outlines several respects in which the market and the legal
system have moved away from characteristics that previously made enterprise
liability desirable, and Part VI identifies potentially significant trends that
could lead to a rapprochement between our health care system and the public
policy justifications for extending malpractice liability to managed care
organizations.  Finally, Part VII suggests that federal legislation is necessary for
malpractice liability to serve socially constructive purposes in managed care,
and identifies a set of principles that should guide future legislative action.
II
ENTERPRISE LIABILITY IN THEORY
Improving the American medical malpractice system will require a number
of significant changes.  The current structure provides poorly for the needs of
negligently injured patients, encourages costly, contentious, and wasteful
litigation, and is predisposed to both groundless lawsuits and excessive awards.
Enterprise liability is not a panacea for all these ailments; rather it is one of
several new approaches intended to promote fair compensation, clinical quality
improvement, and administrative efficiency in a future health care system
based primarily on managed care.4
Academic views of the effectiveness of medical malpractice law as a
compensatory mechanism and as a deterrent to carelessness have been shaped
primarily by the Harvard Medical Practice Study, which attempted to measure
the incidence of malpractice in New York State hospitals in 1984.  The Harvard
Study concluded that, although approximately one percent of hospital
admissions included a negligent event resulting in injury, there was a gross
mismatch between negligently injured patients and patients receiving
                                                          
4. See Eleanor D. Kinney, Malpractice Reforms in the 1990s: Past Disappointments, Future
Success?, 20 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 99 (1995).
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compensation through malpractice litigation.5  A subsequent study drawn from
the same data concluded that the severity of the patient’s ultimate disability,
not the existence of negligence or even the occurrence of an adverse event
during medical treatment, predicted payments made in settlement or at trial.6
This evidence suggests that medical malpractice law provides compensation
unevenly, directing windfall awards at some seriously injured patients, but
leaving the majority of deserving claimants unsatisfied.7
The deterrent impact of malpractice litigation is also debatable.  The
malpractice system may contribute to policing flagrant recidivism among
careless or incompetent physicians by rendering them uninsurable.  However,
its effectiveness at promoting quality at the margin is doubtful, especially given
the discrepancy between deserving plaintiffs and judicial outcomes.8  Certainly,
potential malpractice exposure increases clinical intrusiveness, but whether this
“defensive medicine” represents appropriate care or wasteful overtesting and
overtreatment remains unsettled.9  Neither has definitive work established the
extent of risk avoidance by physicians confronted with potentially litigious
patients or extremely hazardous health conditions.10
Compounding its questionable effect on compensation and deterrence, the
malpractice system is extremely time-consuming and expensive.11  Malpractice
                                                          
5. See HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS AND LAWYERS: STUDIES
OF MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK
(1990); Troyen A. Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized Patients:
Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study I, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370 (1991); Howard H. Hiatt
et al., A Study of Medical Injury and Medical Malpractice: An Overview, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 480
(1989); Lucian L. Leape et al., The Nature of Adverse Events in Hospitalized Patients: Results of the
Harvard Medical Practice Study II, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 377 (1991); A. Russell Localio et al.,
Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Due to Negligence: Results of the Harvard
Medical Practice Study III, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 245 (1991).  Only one-eighth of the events judged
to be negligent in the study led to malpractice litigation, and only half of those were eventually
compensated.  However, five claims were filed with respect to care not considered negligent for every
valid one.
6. See Troyen A. Brennan et al., Relation Between Negligent Adverse Events and the Outcomes of
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1963 (1996).  In a general sense, then, medical
malpractice law serves a compensatory function, but in a manner unrelated to causation or fault.
7. Cases with considerable legal merit but modest financial impact are of particular concern
because most plaintiffs’ attorneys will not pursue medical malpractice cases with potential recoveries
under $50,000.  See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: A FRAMEWORK
FOR ACTION (1987).
8. Coupled with a “small numbers” problem of individual physicians infrequently encountering
claims, this mismatch also makes insurers unable to experience rate liability policies, tempering still
further any deterrent effect.
9. See Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?, Q.J. ECON.,
May 1996, at 355, 388 (finding that states with tort reform laws have lower rates of increase in
Medicare Part A costs).
10. See Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Defensive Medicine and Tort Reform: New Evidence in an Old
Bottle, 21 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 267 (Spring 1996).  Physicians also may avoid high-risk patients
for other reasons, such as the potential adverse effect on publicly released “report cards” listing
surgeon mortality.  See Eric C. Schneider & Arnold M. Epstein, Influence of Cardiac-Surgery
Performance Reports on Referral Practices and Access to Care: A Survey of Cardiovascular Specialists,
335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 251 (1996).
11. If the malpractice system is so bad, one might ask why it even exists.  Perhaps the answer is
that, like democracy, it is the worst possible system except for all the others.
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claims take on average sixteen months to file and twenty-five months to
resolve.12  Moreover, transaction costs consume well over half of premium
dollars or jury awards, with attorneys’ fees comprising much of this category.13
A.  Enterprise Liability and Managed Care
Legislatively imposed enterprise liability was conceived as a specific
response to the anticipated growth of managed care and its potential effect on
quality and safety.  As is now well known, managed care dramatically alters
traditional relationships among payers, physicians, and patients.  In many cases,
patients look to managed care organizations to coordinate the delivery of
medically appropriate services by qualified providers as well as to pay the bills.
And, instead of merely seeking reimbursement, many physicians negotiate with
health plans to establish contractual relationships that ensure a steady source of
patients, and to develop policies for cost-effective treatment and referral that
comport with professional standards.
Of course, the purpose of managing care is to control cost.  Patients and
physicians are concerned—quite justifiably—about the effect that a system
driven by economics will have on quality of care and professional
independence.  Patients fear that care managers will pay insufficient attention
to the clinical consequences of their actions and will engage in de facto
rationing of expensive services.  Physicians fear they will be caught between a
rock and a hard place, beset on one side by arbitrary contracting policies and
administrative requirements, and on the other by legal responsibility for sub-
optimal clinical outcomes.  Enterprise liability for medical malpractice is a
possible way to reduce conflict, curb abuses, and protect patients in a managed
health care system.
B.  Proposals for Systematic Enterprise Liability
In the early 1990s, two proposals were made to establish a model for
enterprise liability that would replace suits against individual physicians: (1) a
system of hospital-based liability proposed in 1992 by law professors Paul
Weiler and Kenneth Abraham,14 and (2) a system of health plan-based liability
considered in 1993 by President Clinton’s Task Force on National Health Care
                                                          
12. See MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SOLUTIONS: SYSTEMS AND PROPOSALS FOR INJURY
COMPENSATION 41 (M. Martin Halley et al. eds., 1989).
13. See, e.g., THE URBAN INSTITUTE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: PROBLEMS & REFORMS: A
POLICY-MAKER’S GUIDE TO ISSUES AND INFORMATION 14 (Intergovernmental Health Policy Project
ed., 1995) (discussing 1985 RAND study finding that plaintiffs received only 43% of their tort awards).
14. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & PAUL C. WEILER, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION,
ORGANIZATIONAL LIABILITY FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: AN ALTERNATIVE TO INDIVIDUAL
HEALTH CARE PROVIDER LIABILITY FOR HOSPITAL RELATED MALPRACTICE (1992); Abraham &
Weiler, supra note 1; Kenneth S. Abraham et al., Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury: Further
Reflections, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 333 (1993); Paul C. Weiler et al., Proposal for Medical Liability
Reform, 267 JAMA 2355 (1992); see also II AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTERS’ STUDY:
ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY: APPROACHES TO LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE (1991); Stephen D. Sugarman, A Restatement of Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1992).
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Reform.15  While each proposal had original elements, neither was cut from
whole cloth.16
1.  Hospital Liability.  Weiler and Abraham’s proposal for enterprise
medical liability assigned responsibility for physicians’ negligence not to
managed care organizations but to hospitals.  The genesis of the proposal was
primarily the savings that could be achieved by consolidating the defense of
malpractice claims.17  Because the majority of medical malpractice cases arise
from hospital care, and the most severe injuries occur in hospitals, it seemed
natural that hospitals should assume the lead in defending lawsuits.  It also
occurred to Weiler and Abraham that hospitals and other traditional health
care facilities have established peer review procedures that would allow them
to monitor the competence of physicians practicing within their walls, and to
create environments that improve the quality of care.
Some recent trends cut against their approach, however.  The current broad
shift toward ambulatory and home-based care is resulting in a greater
percentage of malpractice cases with no hospital involvement.  In addition,
hospitals are seldom contractually affiliated with physicians, except with
respect to staff privileges.  As a result, physicians would receive a financial
windfall from any transfer of liability, and hospitals would suffer a
corresponding loss, unless totally unrelated third-party payers adjusted their
reimbursement rates accordingly.
Despite these limitations, the Weiler and Abraham proposal emphasized
placing liability on the institution with the clearest involvement in health care
delivery, rather than on individual physicians or purely financing entities such
as insurers.18  The proposal thus anticipated to some degree the difficulties of
institutional liability in the current managed care marketplace, where provider
networks restructure frequently, and the name given to an organization, or
even an organizational category, often indicates little about its actual
function.19  In addition, many hospitals are forming integrated delivery systems
or acquiring physician practices in order to contract jointly with managed care
organizations.  Hospital-based liability could be efficient in these situations.
                                                          
15. See Robert Pear, Clinton Advisors Outline Big Shift for Malpractice, N.Y. TIMES, May 21,
1993, at A1; Sage et al., supra note 1; Elaine Zablocki, Tort Reform, HMO MAG., May/June 1994, at
74.
16. See Barry R. Furrow, Medical Malpractice and Cost Containment: Tightening the Screws, 36
CASE W. L. REV. 985, 1030-32 (1986) (discussing the possible effects of institutional liability); E. Haavi
Morreim, Cost Containment and the Standard of Medical Care, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1719, 1746-50 (1987)
(analyzing hospital and/or health plan liability); Myron F. Steves, Jr., A Proposal to Improve the Cost
to Benefit Relationships in the Medical Professional Liability Insurance System, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1305
(proposing transfer of medical malpractice liability to hospitals).
17. Several hospitals already had done so successfully through “channeling” programs.  See infra
text accompanying notes 73-74.
18. See Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the Choice of the
Responsible Enterprise, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 29 (1994).
19. Managed care consultants frequently observe that “if you’ve seen one managed care
organization, you’ve seen one managed care organization.”  See infra text accompanying notes 162-78.
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2.  Health Plan Liability.  As both a logical and a practical matter, adoption
of enterprise liability during the 1993-94 health care reform debate relied on
the concurrent passage of universal health coverage based on managed
competition.20  This legislatively created managed health care system would
have been composed of “health plans,” that is integrated organizations that
combined health care financing with the provision of services.  Health plans
might have been unitary corporations or contractual networks, and could have
been owned or controlled by any combination of physicians, hospitals, insurers,
and other health care entities.  Regardless of their structure, however, health
plans would have received a fixed annual payment, and would have been
responsible for organizing and delivering necessary care to enrollees.
In an environment where health care is planned, managed, and provided by
a “system” instead of being rendered by unaffiliated, individual practitioners,
holding health plans primarily accountable for instances of medical malpractice
is appealing for three reasons.  First, health plans already would be primarily
responsible for cost containment.  Legal liability for negligent health outcomes
therefore should make health plans reluctant to cut costs by reducing quality,
especially when weighing aggregate budgetary concerns against the health
needs of individual patients.  Second, unlike torts that involve strangers (such
as automobile accidents or toxic spills), medical malpractice arises between
parties who have a pre-existing relationship, which health plans could formalize
and extend.  Health plans enroll beneficiaries using detailed insurance
agreements, and rely on contractual relationships with providers to allocate
financial risk, determine the price of services, and assure cost-consciousness.
As a whole, these agreements could form the basis for quality improvement
activities, communication of grievances, and efficient dispute resolution.21
Third, health could be subjected to significant direct regulation and oversight.22
In the Clinton bill, for example, health plans were required to comply with
national standards on the accessibility and impartiality of grievance procedures;
to collect, process, and publish comprehensive information on clinical
performance; and to work closely with purchasing alliances as well as with state
and federal authorities to ensure access to and quality of care.
In theory, a well-managed health plan subject to enterprise liability would
affiliate with high-quality providers, work to improve practice patterns through
better information, seek out evidence of enrollee dissatisfaction, and move
quickly to investigate and redress injuries.  To accomplish this in the context of
                                                          
20. See Health Equity and Access Reform Today Act, H.R. 3704, 103d Cong. (1993); Health
Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. (1993); Managed Competition Act, H.R. 3222, 103d Cong. (1993).
21. For example, holding health plans primarily accountable would still permit hospital-based
liability in cases where hospitals are best suited to manage cost and quality.  Academic health centers
or other hospitals that serve patients covered by many health plans simply could assume liability from
those health plans by contract.
22. See H.R. 3600, S. 1757, 103d Cong. (1993).  Reflecting this high degree of regulatory scrutiny,
the term “accountable health plan” was used in theoretical treatments of managed competition and in
early drafts of the Clinton proposal.  See Paul Starr & Walter A. Zelman, A Bridge to Compromise:
Competition Under a Budget, HEALTH AFF., Supp. 1993, at 7, 13.
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comprehensive national health care reform, enterprise liability might have been
designed according to the following principles:
 
(1) Each health plan that selectively contracts with or employs
physicians, performs utilization review, and administers a quality
improvement program would be liable for negligent injury to its
enrollees caused by the health plan’s affiliated practitioners and
providers.
 
(2) Physicians and other health professionals practicing as employees of
or under contract to such health plans would be granted legal
immunity from suit.23
 
(3) Institutional providers, such as hospitals, that are well positioned to
monitor and improve the quality of care within their organizations
would be encouraged to assume liability for themselves and their
affiliated physicians through indemnification or risk-sharing
contracts with health plans.
 
(4) Less adversarial methods of dispute resolution such as arbitration,
early offers of settlement,24 “no-fault” compensation including
“accelerated compensation events” (“ACEs”),25 or other
contractual alternatives to litigation would be permitted, so that
health plans could compensate fairly and rapidly a greater
percentage of injured patients.
 
(5) Legal limits on non-economic or punitive damages would be
instituted to eliminate the threat of unreasonably large awards
against corporate defendants, perhaps based on a sliding scale that
accounts for severity and duration of injury.26
 
                                                          
23. Health plans would be prohibited from requiring practitioners to indemnify them for
malpractice losses or to purchase insurance, but would be allowed to adjust compensation or
reimbursement by contract to reflect the shift in aggregate liability.  In theory, there is no reason that
individual physicians could not be liable as well, so long as plaintiffs generally elected to sue health
plans.  For example, this seems to be the pattern in litigation involving Kaiser Permanente.  On a
widespread basis, however, allowing individual liability in a fully insured market would have risked
perpetuating the current system.  See infra text accompanying notes 181-82.
24. See Henson Moore & Jeffrey O’Connell, Foreclosing Medical Malpractice Claims by Prompt
Tender of Economic Loss, 44 LA. L. REV. 1267, 1285 (1984); Jeffrey O’Connell, Neo-No-Fault
Remedies For Medical Injuries: Coordinated Statutory and Contractual Alternatives, 49 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 124 (Spring 1986).
25. See Laurence R. Tancredi & Randall R. Bovbjerg, Rethinking Responsibility for Patient Injury:
Accelerated-Compensation Events—A Malpractice and Quality Reform Ripe for a Test, 54 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (Spring 1991).
26. See Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling “Pain and
Suffering”, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908 (1989).
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(6) Unaffiliated providers that elect to treat predominantly “out-of-
network” patients would be required to maintain individual
malpractice insurance, and would be jointly liable with each injured
patient’s health plan.27
C.  Potential Benefits of Enterprise Liability
In a reformed health care system based on managed care, enterprise
liability offers several advantages over current malpractice law.  These include
higher quality care by virtue of a more focused deterrent effect, improved
compensation for negligent injury, and reduced costs of administration.
1. Quality Improvement.  The most important benefit of enterprise liability
is that it could act as a potent counterweight to incentives to underserve captive
populations of patients enrolled in managed care, while at the same time
reducing physician-driven “defensive medicine.”  If health plans are held liable
for patient injury, they might contract with providers and evaluate practice
patterns based on quality instead of engaging in “economic credentialing.”28
At the same time, physicians—relieved of many concerns over individual
liability—might participate more readily in cooperative decisionmaking and
might be less resistant to clinical practice guidelines and other efforts by health
plans to induce cost-effective practice on a system-wide basis.
Some commentators have argued that the management of cost and the
delivery of clinical services should be kept separate by immunizing physicians
from economic incentives and by preventing health plans from imposing
utilization control procedures.29  In a cost-constrained environment, however,
assigning malpractice liability only to individual physicians leads practitioners
and managed care organizations to pull in opposite directions, discouraging
coordination and teamwork in the provision of health care services.30  Given
the need for efficiency in health care delivery, a system in which managers and
physicians work at cross purposes is dysfunctional.
There is also reason to believe that health care enterprises would be
effective at improving care.  Experts on medical quality have long recognized
the anomaly of focusing accountability on individual physicians.  As Donald
Berwick observes, “[t]he doctor no longer really controls health care, as in the
days of solo practice….  Control is shifting, structure is shifting, the pattern of
                                                          
27. The theory of shared liability was to encourage physicians to join networks and health plans to
improve their provider panels and reduce out-of-network utilization.
28. Economic credentialing is the phrase used to describe the practice of evaluating affiliated
physicians based primarily on the costs they generate rather than the quality of their care.
29. See Arnold S. Relman, Medical Practice Under The Clinton Reforms—Avoiding Domination
By Business, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1574 (1993).
30. In June 1993, for example, the author participated in a discussion of health care reform among
key stakeholders in New Mexico.  Most of the physicians present agreed on the need to improve the
cost-effectiveness of clinical practice, but questioned how physicians could be expected to follow the
conservative recommendations of health plans when they, not the health plans, were responsible for
medical malpractice.
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care is shifting; but accountability is not.”31  For example, one quality-related
benefit of enterprise liability involves information.  Most malpractice experts
agree that a large percentage of malpractice suits result from
miscommunication among providers and between providers and patients.32
Under enterprise liability, health plans would be responsible for errors in
communication and would therefore invest more readily in support systems to
enhance the amount, quality, and flow of information.33  In addition, the
potential for enterprise liability based on lack of informed consent would likely
encourage health plans to work with practitioners to assure that accurate
information is provided to patients.34
An important caveat is that managed care organizations operating under
the threat of liability may not always take constructive approaches to risk
management.35  For example, a physician’s livelihood may depend on entering
into contracts with health plans.  Although enterprise liability should lead plans
to value clinical quality more highly, it might also cause them to avoid
affiliating with physicians who are at greater risk for litigation, even when the
physician’s ability is unquestioned.
2.  Improved Compensation.  A particular appeal of enterprise liability as
part of national health care reform was the potential to improve the
compensation of tort victims without greatly increasing costs.  Because health
plans must provide necessary treatment, they are automatically responsible for
continuing medical care arising from iatrogenic injuries, including professional
negligence.  Given that future medical expenses comprise about twenty-five
percent of damage awards in malpractice cases, some degree of compensation
                                                          
31. DONALD M. BERWICK ET AL., CURING HEALTH CARE: NEW STRATEGIES FOR QUALITY
IMPROVEMENT 12 (1990).  Studies of surgical hospitalizations, for example, have suggested that
institutional and group characteristics predict performance to a greater degree than “surgeon effect.”
See ANN B. FLOOD & W. RICHARD SCOTT, HOSPITAL STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE 227-59, 347
(1987).
32. A recent study of intensive care concluded that adverse events were common and that more
than one-fourth of them were due to misunderstandings between hospital staff members or
administrative errors.  See Lori Andrews et al., An Alternative Strategy for Studying Adverse Events in
Medical Care, 349 LANCET 309 (1997).
33. Adverse drug reactions are a significant cause of medical morbidity and mortality that often
would be preventable through institutional surveillance.  See, e.g., David W. Bates et al., The Costs of
Adverse Drug Events in Hospitalized Patients, 277 JAMA 307 (1997) (stating that preventable adverse
drug events add nearly $3 million to the annual cost of operating a large hospital); David C. Classen et
al., Adverse Drug Events in Hospitalized Patients, 277 JAMA 301, 305 (1997) (finding that almost half
of adverse drug events were preventable).
34. Several studies have established that poor communication between doctors and patients
correlates strongly with malpractice litigation.  See Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors That Prompted
Families to File Medical Malpractice Claims Following Perinatal Injuries, 267 JAMA 1359, 1361-63
(1992); see also Communicating Seen as Key to Malpractice-Free Radiology, AMER. MED. NEWS, June
23, 1997, at 10.  Moreover, new research in this issue suggests that institutional processes can help
address these problems.  See, e.g., Gerald B. Hickson et al., Development of an Early Identification and
Response Model of Malpractice Prevention, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (Winter 1997) (describing
peer review of physicians who generate large numbers of patient complaints).
35. This certainly has been true of physicians, who both overtreat (“positive defensive medicine”)
and underserve (“negative defensive medicine”).
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is therefore automatically built into enterprise liability.36
In addition, health plans participating in managed competition would be
subject to regulatory oversight.  Arguably, health plans’ more direct incentive
under enterprise liability to suppress evidence of malpractice makes monitoring
essential.  At the same time, however, organizations would be somewhat easier
to supervise than is currently the case with individual physicians, who tend to
be both strategically and cognitively averse to acknowledging error.  Among
other things, regulations could require plans to have ombudsman programs and
structured grievance and appeals mechanisms.  This would amplify patient
“voice,” bringing a greater percentage of injured patients to the attention of the
malpractice system than typically occurs today through the entrepreneurial
efforts of plaintiffs’ attorneys.
3.  Administrative Efficiency.  Imposing enterprise liability on health plans
might result in the establishment of explicit contractual arrangements between
health plans and patients for addressing most disputes over possible negligence.
In California, for example, Kaiser-Permanente not only assumes liability for its
affiliated physicians but resolves allegations of negligence using court-
approved, binding arbitration.37  Although enterprise liability is not necessary
for health plans to adopt structured alternatives to litigation, fewer health plans
are likely to devise fair, enforceable dispute resolution systems in its absence.38
Even without contractual forms of dispute resolution, enterprise liability
has the potential to improve efficiency in the prevailing court-based system if it
consolidates the defense of malpractice actions.  Given that approximately
twenty-five percent of malpractice suits involve more than one defendant,39
enterprise liability could substantially reduce the transaction costs created by
multiple parties with conflicting interests in terms of court costs, attorneys’
fees, and the potential for strategic behavior in settlement negotiations and
litigation tactics.
Finally, enterprise liability might improve the market for malpractice
                                                          
36. See HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, supra note 5, at 8.  This is not entirely a
theoretical point, even though large components of future medical expenses, such as long-term and
custodial care, seldom are covered by standard health insurance.  Many quality-related practices in
managed care, including disease prevention, detection, and early treatment, depend on managed care
organizations having long-term commitments to their enrollees.  Single-year insurance contracts and
high market turnover dilute the incentives for these activities.  On the other hand, ease of consumer
exit also may be important to promoting quality-based competition, especially in cases where patients
have received unsatisfactory care.
37. See Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 17 Cal. 3d 699 (1976) (upholding mandatory arbitration
of medical malpractice claims).  But see Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, 115 Cal. 4th 951, modified
by 1997 WL 426233 (1997) (holding Kaiser liable for fraudulent failure to fulfill its obligations under
its arbitration program).  See also infra text accompanying notes 157-161.
38. Many insurers (and contracting organizations such as PPOs) neither claim nor acknowledge a
relationship between their role in health care financing and the incidence of medical malpractice.
Consequently, few statements of coverage address dispute resolution in malpractice cases.  See
Elizabeth Rolph et al., Arbitration Agreements in Health Care: Myths and Reality, 60 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 153 (Winter 1997); see also infra text accompanying notes 118-24.
39. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: CHARACTERISTICS OF
CLAIMS CLOSED IN 1984 (1986).
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insurance.  Health plans and other large institutions would be able to diversify
their insurance premiums across a full range of practitioners and services,
reduce administrative costs, and self-insure or drive a hard bargain with
insurance carriers.  By spreading malpractice risk, enterprise liability might also
help improve access to services, such as obstetrical care, for which high
malpractice premiums and small risk pools have limited the availability of
providers in some geographic areas.40
III
THE LIMITED INITIAL APPEAL OF ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
Despite its theoretical promise, the Clinton Administration’s enterprise
liability proposal fell flat.  The concept came into public view as a “trial
balloon” of the Administration’s health care task force in April 1993,
immediately floated into a storm of opposition, and quickly proved leaden.
Intended both as a policy-based imposition of responsibility on managed care
plans in recognition of their expanded role, and as a political benefit to doctors
who would be liberated from the threat of individual lawsuits, enterprise
liability provoked a reaction that took its proponents by surprise.41  In
retrospect, the criticism related less to the proposal per se than to what its
announcement indicated about the direction of change in the American health
care system.
A.  Public Perceptions
Enterprise liability went against the conventional wisdom of medical
malpractice in several major respects.  First, patients and the medical
profession were uncomfortable with the notion of “corporate healing,” while
enterprise liability explicitly acknowledged that health care has become more
an institutional process than a series of discrete interactions between patients
and individual physicians.  Second, most physicians and much of the public
believed that medical litigation benefited lawyers more than patients,42 while
enterprise liability relied on existing tort law to create incentives for quality
improvement and appropriate compensation.
A third reason that proposals for structured forms of enterprise liability did
not strike a responsive chord with the general public was the paucity of
litigation involving managed care.  Academics had predicted a torrent of
malpractice suits against managed care organizations for nearly a decade, but
                                                          
40. See Dana Hughes et al., Obstetrical Care for Low-Income Women: The Effects of Medical
Malpractice on Community Health Centers, in II MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY AND THE
DELIVERY OF OBSTETRICAL CARE (Virginia P. Rostow & Roger J. Bulger eds., 1989).
41. See The Sinking of Enterprise Liability, AM. MED. NEWS, July 5, 1993, at 17.  On the other
hand, enterprise liability received support from employer coalitions such as the Washington Business
Group on Health and professional societies such as the American Nurses Association.
42. Medical malpractice was one of several important discontinuities between the policy
community and public opinion in 1993-94.  See Robert J. Blendon et al., Bridging the Gap Between
Expert and Public Views on Health Care Reform, 269 JAMA 2573 (1993).
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only a trickle had materialized by the time of the 1993-94 health care reform
debate.43  Simple ignorance may be the most likely explanation for this.  At the
time, few lawyers (or potential plaintiffs) understood what managed care was,
much less the influence it was beginning to have on American health care.
B.  Interest Group Politics
Enterprise liability also offended important political constituencies.
Organized medicine’s reaction was particularly violent, though easily
explainable with hindsight.  For one, the fact that enterprise liability applied to
health plans signaled the Clinton Administration’s commitment to managed
care for its still undisclosed health care reform proposal.44  This alone
confirmed the worst fears of the medical profession.45  Medicine viewed
enterprise liability as an embodiment of the threat large corporate
organizations posed to professional practice.  For example, organized medicine
feared that, if held liable, health plans would summarily terminate high-risk
physicians and micromanage clinical practice.46
Another reason physicians opposed enterprise liability was its lack of
resemblance to more familiar legislative changes affecting medical malpractice.
Physicians had spent the previous two decades lobbying for barriers to
litigation and limitations on recovery as the sole components of malpractice
reform, using California’s MICRA statute as the prototype.47  For the Clinton
Administration to proffer a shift or even arguably an expansion of liability as
“tort reform” seemed a cruel joke to veterans of medicine’s long-standing
campaign against the trial bar.
                                                          
43. See RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE DELIVERY AND TORT: SYSTEMS
ON A COLLISION COURSE? (Elizabeth Rolph ed., 1991); William A. Chittenden III, Malpractice
Liability and Managed Health Care: History and Prognosis, 26 TORTS & INS. L.J. 451 (1991).
44. As with many rumors at the time, this turned out not to be entirely true.  The final Health
Security Act saddled managed care with a variety of surcharges and restrictions in order to subsidize
the continuation of fee-for-service practice in Medicare and elsewhere.  At the time the public became
aware of enterprise liability, however, not even a preliminary draft of the overall legislation had been
released (or composed, for that matter).
45. Fear of managed care also may explain the lack of enthusiasm for enterprise liability among
organized consumer advocacy groups, which normally are staunch defenders of the tort system.  See
Vicki Kemper, Lawyers on Trial: On Capitol Hill, the Trial Lawyers Never Lose … Ever.  But That
May Be About to Change, COMMON CAUSE MAG., (Summer 1993) (quoting Joan Claybrook as saying
that “[t]he tort system is the only part of our economic system geared to representing the individual
citizen”).  In addition, consumer groups may have recognized (as may have the trial bar) that any
version of enterprise liability actually incorporated into a health care reform plan would have included
“compromise elements” such as mandatory dispute resolution or caps on damages.
46. One rhetorical consequence was to introduce an Alice-in-Wonderland version of rights
discourse to the medical malpractice debate, based on the old management axiom “no responsibility
without control.”  The author recalls a personal conversation with Robert A. Berenson, wherein
Berenson recounted that at a contentious 1993 meeting of the Physician Insurers Association of
America, one irate medical leader went so far as to condemn enterprise liability for violating his
“constitutional right to be sued.”  At the same time, of course, the managed care industry protested
against enterprise liability on the ground that it could not control the behavior of physicians.
47. See Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA), codified at CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 1994), CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333 (West 1994), CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§
340.5, 1295 (West 1994).
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Enterprise liability also posed a danger to one of the least visible but most
influential groups involved in the medical malpractice system: liability insurers.
The proposal would have restructured the market for liability insurance in two
ways.  First, larger organizations bearing malpractice risk would be more likely
to self-insure and less likely to require commercial coverage.  Second, exclusive
health plan liability would reduce the power of physician-owned insurance
companies, leading to competition between those companies and the
organizations that insure hospitals and other institutions.48  Because many
physician-owned insurers maintain close financial and managerial ties to county
and state medical societies, their business concerns were converted quickly to
political action.
Neither did enterprise liability enthrall plaintiffs’ lawyers.  Attorney lobbies
were more concerned with imminent and potentially adverse changes in
securities and product liability law than with the more speculative realm of
health care reform.49  Managed care had not yet acquired the dubious
reputation among the general public that would make it an attractive defendant
to put in front of a civil jury.  In addition, the specialized medical malpractice
bar was accustomed to bringing suits against doctors and hospitals,50 but had
little notion of insurance law or ERISA.51  Moreover, liability insurance was
entrenched firmly in the physician model, so that a deep pocket was already
available, and settlement negotiations could be conducted through established
relationships between plaintiffs’ lawyers and defense counsel.
IV
THE MOVEMENT TO MANAGED CARE LIABILITY
Since 1993, however, expanding malpractice liability to include managed
care organizations has become the rage.  There is currently little trace of the
opposition or even apathy toward enterprise liability that prevailed among key
constituencies during the health care reform debate.  In basic terms, three
things happened: Physicians got squeezed, patients got scared, and lawyers got
interested.
Physicians in much of the country were surprised to discover that the defeat
                                                          
48. These so-called “bedpan mutuals” have been regarded as saviors by physicians ever since the
“crisis of availability” of malpractice insurance during the 1970s when commercial companies were
deserting them.  See Paul C. Weiler, Fixing the Tail: The Place of Malpractice in Health Care Reform,
47 RUTGERS L. REV. 1157, 1191 (1995).
49. In any event, the Clinton Administration’s 1,600-plus page Health Security Act was a full
employment act for attorneys with health care expertise.
50. In states with strict tort reforms like California, only a small number of legal practitioners
worked in medical malpractice, and the area was not thought sufficiently lucrative to attract other
lawyers.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 77-85.  Because of this inexperience, ERISA’s preemptive
scope may have been especially daunting to plaintiffs’ attorneys when the occasional complaint filed
against a managed care organization was answered with motions to remove to federal court and to
dismiss.
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of the Clinton health plan could not keep managed care from coming.52
Managed care took control anyway, and was allowed much freer rein than if
comprehensive health care reform legislation had accompanied it.  Among
other things, health plans terminated high-cost physicians (whether because of
sicker-than-average patient populations or expensive practice styles), and
imposed strict utilization standards on clinical decisions.  Regardless of the
actual or potential consequences of their actions, health plans generally
disclaimed moral responsibility for patient care, citing doctors’ duty to ensure
quality, and legal liability, citing ERISA preemption.53  Initially, courts tended
to agree in both respects, putting physicians in the difficult position of trying to
protect themselves in a relationship where, because of market conditions, they
had little leverage.54  Having learned these hard lessons, organized medicine
now endorses proposals to make malpractice claims more accessible in
managed care—reversing not only its opposition to the Clinton proposal but
several decades of resistance to the use of tort litigation as a quality
improvement tool.55
Managed care as a threat to quality also began to resonate with consumers,
whose fears had been aroused during the bitter political rhetoric of the health
care reform debate.  The chronic unpopularity of the insurance industry in
general, combined with specific journalistic exposés of managed care,
frightened the public and sent it seeking legislative relief.56  Physicians’ vocal
antipathy to managed care reinforced consumers’ concerns.  Entrepreneurial
lawyers quickly capitalized on these trends, often invoking the manifest
unfairness of ERISA preemption to garner sympathy for their position.57  Even
the so-called Republican revolution of 1994, including a provision in the
Contract With America promising broad tort reform, could not stem the
growing tide of resistance to the perceived power of managed care
organizations.58
                                                          
52. Cf. THEODORE GEISEL, HOW THE GRINCH STOLE CHRISTMAS (1957) (“He HADN’T
stopped Christmas from coming!  IT CAME!/Somehow or other, it came just the same!”).
53. See infra text accompanying notes 99-142.
54. See, e.g., Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that
patient arguably injured by action of utilization review contractor had no meaningful remedy because
of ERISA); Wickline v. California, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1630 (1986) (noting the potential for managed
care liability in dictum, but refusing to excuse physician from obligation to advocate for patient’s
interests).
55. The AMA also has muted its opposition to enterprise liability per se, acknowledging it as an
alternative to traditional tort reform worth continued evaluation.  The AMA’s policy objective for
managed care liability is now tactfully stated as “that … all managed care organizations (“MCOs”) are
held responsible for assuring quality healthcare, and are held liable for any negligence on the part of
the health plan resulting in patient injury.”  AMERICAN MED. ASS’N, REPORT OF THE BOARD OF
TRUSTEES 18-I-96 (1996).
56. At the same time, many legislators and their families also were apprehensive about managed
care, or had suffered difficulties accessing care or resolving billing issues.
57. See Robert Pear, H.M.O.’s Using Federal Law to Deflect Malpractice Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
17, 1996, at A3.
58. Fee-for-service medicine’s longstanding support of the Republican Party prompted several
inconsistencies between Congress’s positions on health care and on other industries.  In addition to
supporting tort liability for managed care organizations while opposing it more generally, the
SAGE4.FMT 04/01/98  8:11 AM
Page 159: Spring 1997] MANAGED CARE LIABILITY 173
The adverse publicity surrounding health care cost-containment and the
inevitable horror stories attributable to managed care also grabbed the
attention of trial lawyers.59  Moreover, in cases not subject to ERISA, the
prevalence of corporate rather than individual defendants in managed care
litigation, and the potential inapplicability of traditional tort reform laws,
dangled the carrot of large punitive damage awards before plaintiffs’ lawyers.60
In 1995, three of the nation’s ten largest jury verdicts involved health care
institutions.61
A.  Established Forms of Corporate Liability
Much as the enterprise liability proposals made during the national health
care reform debate were not written on a blank slate, the ongoing expansion of
managed care liability reflects the fact that courts long have been cognizant of
corporate trends in health care delivery.  It would be surprising indeed if health
care enterprises that have become more than passive facilitators of physician-
determined care should escape legal accountability for their actions.62  As the
Physician Payment Review Commission observed in its 1994 Report to
Congress, “[e]nterprise liability is probably an inevitable result of legal trends
and the incentives sharpened by increased competition in the medical
marketplace.”63
1.  Vicarious Liability.  Over the last few decades, courts developed at least
four rationales for imposing liability on health care entities whose relationships
with patients and physicians potentially affect the quality of care.  Two
doctrinal approaches impute to organizations responsibility for the actions of
individual physicians.64  First, under the long-standing principle of respondeat
superior, employers are generally liable for the acts of their employees.  As a
result, government health systems such as the Veterans Administration,
                                                          
Republican Congress proposed antitrust exemptions for doctors despite a general commitment to free-
market competition, and showed a willingness to regulate managed care at the risk of increasing health
costs for employers.
59. See Roger Parloff, The HMO Foes, AM. LAW., July/Aug. 1996, at 80; Berkeley Rice, Look
Who’s on the Malpractice Hot Seat Now, 73 MED. ECON. 192 (1996).
60. See Fox v. Health Net, No. 219692 (Riverside Super. Ct., Mar. 26, 1994) (jury award of $12
million in compensatory and $77 million in punitive damages against HMO for bad faith denial of
insurance coverage and intentional infliction of emotional distress in HDC-ABMT breast cancer case).
In Fox, ERISA defenses were unavailable because the plaintiff was a public schoolteacher.  See id.
61. The usual number in previous years was one or two.  See Verdict Trends in 1995 Disregard the
Clamor: Congressional Tort Revision Uproar Has Had Little Effect, NAT’L. L.J., Feb. 5, 1996, at C2
(“Medical malpractice awards, which had been falling dramatically in recent years, are on the way up
again.”).
62. The effect of ERISA, of course, is one such surprise.  See infra text accompanying notes 99-
115.
63. PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REV. COMM’N, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 299 (1994)
[hereinafter 1994 PPRC REPORT].
64. Unlike legislative proposals for enterprise liability, legal doctrines holding organizations
vicariously liable for the actions of physicians depend on underlying individual liability rather than
replacing it.
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academic and public hospitals with full-time medical staffs, and staff-model
Health Maintenance Organizations (“HMOs”) are wholly responsible for the
negligence of their employed physicians.  Second, state courts have used the
doctrine of ostensible (or apparent) agency, sometimes called agency by
estoppel when reliance is present, to hold hospitals and health maintenance
organizations vicariously liable for the negligence of non-employee physicians
if the health care enterprise has advertised or otherwise held itself out as
assuring the quality of its affiliated staff or provider network.65  Even in the
absence of marketing activities or other explicit conduct, some courts have
imposed a non-delegable duty on hospitals to provide certain physician
services, and have therefore held hospitals vicariously liable for physician
malpractice.66  Iterated vicarious claims are also possible.  In one case, an
HMO was held liable for the acts of consulting specialists selected by the
HMO’s staff physicians.67
2.  Direct Liability.  Lawsuits have successfully held health care
organizations liable for the direct consequences of their actions as well, with or
without claims being made against individual physicians.  First, direct
malpractice liability has roots in hospital peer review procedures.  Health care
facilities have long been responsible for reviewing the credentials of staff
physicians and for monitoring performance to ensure that minimum standards
of patient care are maintained.68
Second, state courts have begun to recognize the increasing oversight of
medical practice by health insurers and have made likely the imposition of
liability based on negligent utilization review or the use of substandard clinical
practice guidelines.69  In the first case to be litigated on this theory, Wickline v.
State of California,70 the court did not find liability, but observed that “[t]hird
party payors of health care services can be held legally accountable when
medically inappropriate decisions result from defects in the design or
implementation of cost containment mechanisms.”71
3.  Private Contracting.  Malpractice liability may be redistributed by
contract as well as by judicial fiat.72  Several health care organizations
                                                          
65. See Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super. 1988); Kashishian v. Port,
481 N.W.2d 277 (Wis. 1992).
66. See Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1987); see also McClellan v. Health Maintenance
Org., 604 A.2d 103 (Pa. Super. 1992).
67. See Schleier v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 876 F.2d 174 (D.C. App. 1989).
68. See Darling v. Charleston Community Mem’l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965); David H.
Rutchik, The Emerging Trend of Corporate Liability: Courts’ Uneven Treatment of Hospital Standards
Leaves Hospitals Uncertain and Exposed, 47 VAND. L. REV. 535 (1994).
69. See Wilson v. Blue Cross, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Ct. App. 1990).
70. 192 Cal. App. 3d 1630 (1986).
71. Id. at  1645.
72. See Richard A. Epstein, Contracting Out of the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 20 PERSP.
BIOLOGY & MED. 228 (1977); Max W. Fine & Jonathan H. Sunshine, Malpractice Reform Through
Consumer Choice and Consumer Education: Are New Concepts Marketable?, 49 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 213 (Spring 1986); William M. Sage & James M. Jorling, A World That Won’t Stand Still:
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voluntarily involve themselves in medical malpractice issues that affect their
affiliated physicians.  For example, the Jewish Philanthropic Hospital
Association in New York City and the Harvard Medical Institutions in Boston
have for many years sponsored “channeling” programs through which they
purchase malpractice coverage for their non-employed medical staffs.73
However, these institutions do not formally accept liability for the acts of the
insured physicians.  Channeling is designed primarily to provide less expensive
insurance coverage for physicians and to reduce administrative costs by
allowing a single insurer and its attorney to represent both the institution and
the physician in the event of a suit.74
Finally, some integrated health care organizations have expressly assumed
liability for their affiliated physicians.  For example, Kaiser Foundation Health
Plan, a group-model HMO that contracts with but does not employ physicians,
has in place a long-term agreement to indemnify and defend the Permanente
Medical Group, a physician partnership, against judgments arising from
malpractice affecting Kaiser patients.75  Recently, more loosely organized
health care networks and health systems have offered to bear responsibility for
malpractice as a way to attract and retain physicians.76
B.  Recent Legal Trends
As described above, corporate responsibility for medical malpractice had
acquired a secure foothold in tort law long before systematic forms of
enterprise liability were proposed.  Courts and legislatures are now building on
these foundations in response to the rapid growth of managed care.
1.  Litigation.  Although up-to-the-minute data on health care litigation are
scarce, anecdotal evidence suggests a heavy downpour of suits against managed
care organizations.  In part, this reflects the delay inherent in litigation, so that
injuries suffered five years ago are only now reaching final determination.  But
there are also other forces at work, some related to managed care itself and
others to the legal system’s response to managed care.
In addition to implicating previously sheltered parties such as insurers,
                                                          
Enterprise Liability by Private Contract, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1007 (1994).
73. See James F. Holzer, Channeling Programs Aid MD-Hospital Cooperation, HOSP., Apr. 5,
1987, at 92; Ann P. Wood, Channeling: Medical Liability Insurance Concept Being Widely Discussed by
Hospitals, PEDIATRIC NEWS, Jan. 1987, at 10.
74. See Medical Malpractice Recommendations for the State of New York: Executive Summary, in
45 RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 573 (1990).
75. It is worth noting that Kaiser has elected to assume malpractice liability only in jurisdictions
such as California that allow mandatory arbitration of claims and place caps on non-economic
damages.  See supra notes 37, 47.
76. See P. Crabtree, HMOs Held More Accountable for Care, SAN DIEGO BUS. J., Nov. 8, 1993, at
1; Edward Felsenthal, Medical Plans Are Shouldering More Liability for Doctor’s Errors, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 18, 1993, at B8.  Because assumption of liability may be construed as a benefit paid in exchange
for referrals, federal fraud and abuse laws present an obstacle to these transactions, at least when
hospitals are involved.  See discussion infra note 196.
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managed care presents opportunities for new causes of action, and reshuffles
liability exposure among traditional physician and hospital defendants.77  To
date, managed care has saved money primarily by reducing inpatient
hospitalization and surgery—directly through preauthorization requirements
and indirectly by using primary care gatekeepers to limit access to specialist
physicians.  Managed care also has used a combination of rules and financial
incentives to decrease utilization at the margin, particularly for ancillary
services such as laboratory testing and radiological studies.78
Each of these raises malpractice concerns.  Although the majority of serious
claims still arise in hospitals, a shift to outpatient care means less malpractice
exposure for facilities and more for physicians and utilization review entities,
especially if failure to hospitalize or operate is associated with injury.  Reliance
on primary care physicians for screening and coordination means more claims
for failure to diagnose and failure to refer.79  Using the theories of tort law
discussed above, managed care organizations can be held directly or vicariously
liable for all of these claims.  In one recent case, a Medicare HMO member was
awarded $1.1 million by an arbitrator, including $100,000 in punitive damages,
for injuries resulting from delays in diagnosing renal failure.80  In another case,
a jury awarded $3 million (reduced under MICRA to $700,000) for failure to
refer for diagnosis of colon cancer, based in part on evidence of financial
incentives to deny care.81
In a situation that exemplifies the emotionally charged environment
surrounding managed care and malpractice, Kaiser recently settled for $5.35
million a Texas wrongful death suit involving failure to diagnose coronary
                                                          
77. For a detailed discussion of many of these issues, see MANAGED CARE LIABILITY (David L.
Leitner ed., 1996); Barry R. Furrow, Managed Care Organizations and Patient Injury: Rethinking
Liability, 31 GA. L. REV. 419 (1997).
78. Rules include utilization review standards and clinical protocols.  Incentives include bonuses
and capitation.  See Alan L. Hillman, Managing the Physician: Rules Versus Incentives, 10 HEALTH
AFF. 138 (Winter 1991).
79. See Linda O. Prager, Gatekeepers on Trial: Primary Care Liability Risks Are Rising with
Growth of Managed Care, AM. MED. NEWS, Feb. 12, 1996, at 1.  Moreover, because invasive medical
procedures have become the mainstay of modern, fee-for-service practice, primary care physicians (at
least those who do not perform deliveries) traditionally had both lower income and lower malpractice
insurance expenses than specialists.  Managed care gatekeeping not only increases liability exposure
based on omissions, but induces primary care physicians to perform more procedures themselves.
Whether primary care earnings have matched increased liability insurance premiums is an interesting
empirical question.
80. The case, Ramey v. Inter Valley Health Plan, is described in David R. Olmos, Pomona HMO
Found Liable in Malpractice Case, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 1997, at D1, D10.  As a Medicare case, it was
not subject to ERISA, and it was brought as a suit for breach of faith and negligence, which arguably
exempted it from MICRA as well.  Unlike ERISA, Medicare’s provisions for administrative resolution
of benefit denials have been held not to preempt state law tort claims.  See Ardary v. Aetna Health
Plans, Inc., 98 F.3d 496 (9th Cir. 1996).  However, it is unclear when Medicare managed care
beneficiaries may bring state court actions without first exhausting federal administrative remedies.
See, e.g., Redmond v. Secure Horizons, Pacificare, Inc., 60 Cal. App. 4th 96 (1997) (holding that claims
for reimbursement for wrongfully denied coverage, unlike wrongful death claims, require prior
exhaustion of Medicare’s administrative review process).  This is yet another example of how the law
ascribes continuing importance to a distinction—between benefits and treatment decisions—that is
increasingly hard to make in practice.  See infra text accompanying notes 118-24.
81. See Ching v. Gaines, No. 137656 (Ventura Cty. Super. Ct., Nov. 30, 1995).
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artery disease.82  The settlement was reached after a non-binding “summary
jury” recommended a $62 million award because an associate medical director
had remarked at an industry conference that Kaiser’s utilization decisions were
financially motivated.  ABC News devoted an entire episode of “Nightline” to
the case, introducing it with the line: “Tonight, the nation’s wealthiest HMO
and why a jury was left outraged.”83
Because they explicitly serve populations of beneficiaries, not just
individual patients, managed care organizations also can be subjected to class
action litigation over some of these practices.  Although class certification and
problems of proof may represent significant hurdles for plaintiffs’ lawyers,84
flawed clinical practice guidelines, systematically biased utilization review, or
heavy-handed physician financial incentives could conceivably form the basis of
liability, with the potential for substantial damages.  These rewards seem to be
attracting class action specialists whose securities fraud or product liability
practices have declined.85
2.  Legislation.  As managed care becomes a political target, legislative
measures to hold managed care organizations liable for malpractice are being
widely debated and enacted.  Some of this activity has been necessary because
of an unexpected barrier to the judicial imposition of liability: state statutory
prohibitions on the corporate practice of medicine.  These laws often date from
the early years of the century, but have seldom been enforced in most states.86
Nonetheless, case law in a few states—notably Texas and New York—has
established that if health care organizations cannot practice medicine, neither
can they commit malpractice.87
                                                          
82. See Karen Brooks, Accord Reached in Irving Health Suit, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Dec.
17, 1997, at 1.
83. Nightline (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 13, 1998).
84. Differences in injuries suffered, factual bases for defenses, and, in federal diversity actions,
legal rights and remedies under diverse state laws may hinder class certification, even for purposes of
settlement rather than prosecution.  See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997);
Castano v. American Tobacco, 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
85. Most class actions against managed care organizations have been brought on fraud theories in
situations involving economic rather than physical injury.  See, e.g., McConocha v. Blue Cross and Blue
Shield, 898 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (involving suit to recover overstated co-payments caused by
defendant’s failure to acknowledge discounts received from providers).  Malpractice cases will often,
but not always, derive from unique circumstances that argue against class treatment.  See Kathy L.
Cerminara, The Class Action as a Method of Patient Empowerment in the Managed Care Setting, 24
AM. J.L. & MED. (forthcoming 1998).
86. See Patricia F. Jacobson, Prohibition Against Corporate Practice of Medicine: Dinosaur or
Dynamic Doctrine?, in 1993 HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 67 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 1993).  Recently,
corporate practice laws have enjoyed a resurgence as a strategic counterweight to the employment of
physicians by hospitals and managed care organizations.  See Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr.,
664 N.E.2d 337 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996), rev’d, 688 N.E.2d 106 (Ill. 1997) (intermediate court ruling voiding
physician’s employment contract with hospital as contrary to Illinois prohibition on corporate
practice).  The Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Berlin retains the prohibition on physician
employment by general corporations, but allows hospitals to employ physicians because hospitals are
already licensed by the state to provide health care services.
87. See Williams v. Good Health Plus, Inc., 743 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no
writ); see also Donivan v. Community Health Plan, No. 882-95 (N.Y. Supreme Ct., Albany Co., June
14, 1996) (holding § 4410.1 of N.Y. Public Health Law bars medical negligence claims against HMOs).
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In part because these decisions could be reversed only by legislation, in
early 1997 Texas became the first state to pass a law specifically subjecting
managed care organizations to liability.88  Under the Texas law, a health
insurance carrier, health maintenance organization, or other managed care
entity has a duty to exercise ordinary care when making health care treatment
decisions, and is liable for harm to an enrollee proximately caused by its failure
to exercise ordinary care.89  However, the Texas enactment is ambiguous in
certain respects.  For example, the statute requires independent review of
claims prior to suit, paralleling notice procedures for medical malpractice suits
against physicians under existing state law, but arguably exempts managed care
claims from other limitations that Texas imposes on conventional malpractice
suits.90  It also seems possible under the new law to sue physicians and
traditional health facilities under one set of legal claims, and managed care
organizations under another set, though both arise from the same activities.
Similar legislation is under consideration elsewhere.91  Missouri recently
enacted a sweeping managed care reform law, including a provision subjecting
HMOs to liability.92  Florida passed a managed care malpractice bill in 1996,
but it was vetoed by the governor.93  New York’s version passed the state
assembly but was delayed in the senate; proponents plan to reintroduce it in
1998.94  Connecticut’s 1997 omnibus managed care consumer protection law
included provisions on liability, but they were deleted before passage.95  Other
states have bills pending.96
                                                          
On the other hand, the  lower court in Berlin was not persuaded that Illinois’s longstanding imposition
of malpractice liability on hospitals implied the unenforceability of that state’s seemingly moribund
corporate practice prohibition.  See Berlin, 664 N.E.2d, at 344; cf. Darling v. Charleston Community
Mem’l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965).  A particularly ironic aspect of the apparently contradictory
outcomes of the two Illinois cases is that the losing party in Darling was the corporate predecessor of
the losing party in Berlin.
88. See S. 386, 75th Leg. (Tex. 1997).
89. Id. § 88.002.
90. See Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act of Texas, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.,
Art. 4590i (West 1997).  Important provisions that probably do not apply to suits against managed care
entities include shortened statutes of limitations and a cap on wrongful death damages.
91. See Leigh Page, Texas Eyes Measure to Extend Liability to Managed Care, AM. MED. NEWS,
Apr. 14, 1997, at 4.
92. See H.R. 335, 89th G.A., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1997) (codified at Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 538.205-
538.30) (adding HMOs to the definition of “health care providers” that may be sued for medical
malpractice).
93. See H.R. 1853, 1996 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1996) (vetoed May 28, 1996).
94. See A.B. 1816, S. 2544, 220th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997) (requiring managed care organizations to
exercise reasonable care when making decisions that affect diagnosis, care, or treatment of members).
95. See 1997 Conn. Acts 99 (Reg. Sess.).
96. See H.R. 314, S. 296, 1997 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1997) (imposing duty of ordinary care and making
managed care plans liable for medical decisions of employees, agents, and representatives); S. 211,
144th Leg. (Ga. 1997) (requiring ordinary diligence in the administration of health benefits); A.B.
3188, 207th Leg. (N.J. 1997) (imposing duty of ordinary care for decisions to delay, reduce, or deny
medical treatment that adversely affect a patient’s health); H.R. 677, 122d Leg. (Ohio 1998) (imposing
duty of ordinary care).
California, Colorado, Maryland, and Maine also are expected to debate liability initiatives in 1998.
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These laws and bills fall short of “ideal” enterprise liability in two respects.
First, they lack the administrative oversight of dispute resolution necessary to
improve access to the malpractice system as a compensatory mechanism.97
Second, they neglect measures to discourage frivolous lawsuits and limit
excessive awards, measures which are needed to provide balanced incentives
for quality improvement.98  Admittedly, the advisability of such restrictions is a
close question.  In fee-for-service practice, caps on non-economic damages
have selectively penalized the most seriously injured plaintiffs, especially
during periods of high medical inflation when lump-sum awards for future
medical expenses often proved inadequate.  On the other hand, institutional
defendants are much more vulnerable than individual physicians to large
punitive damages whose social utility is doubtful.
V
CONCEPTUAL FLAWS IN THE CURRENT MOVEMENT
Although the growth of managed care has obviated many of the original
objections to enterprise liability, new problems—some legal and some
structural—have arisen as barriers to the successful implementation of an
industrial model for addressing medical errors.  These include strained judicial
interpretations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(“ERISA”), the unpredictable applicability of existing tort reform laws to
managed care liability, unexpected regulatory developments affecting
arbitration and alternative dispute resolution, the proliferation of
undifferentiated managed care networks instead of truly integrated health
systems, continued public fixation on individual rather than institutional quality
improvement, and inflexibility in the market for malpractice liability insurance.
                                                          
See, e.g., CALIFORNIA MANAGED HEALTH CARE IMPROVEMENT TASK FORCE, IMPROVING THE
DELIVERY OF CARE AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE, at 8 (1997) (available at
<http://chipp.cahwnet.gov/mctf/PAPERS.htm> (visited Feb. 23, 1998)) (suggesting that the California
legislature pass legislation providing that “entities which contribute to medical decisions affecting
health care, including health plans, hospitals, medical groups, [Independent Practice Associations,
Third Party Administrators, and Professional Service Associations], may be held liable for damages for
harm to a person caused by medical decisions directly contributed to by that entity”).  The Task Force
later backed away from this recommendation and was unable to reach an alternative consensus.  See
Laura Mahoney, Push for Legislation Called Likely Following Task Force’s Managed Care Report,
BNA HEALTH L. REP., Jan. 8, 1998, at 68-69.  Nonetheless, bills introduced in California during 1997
included measures to expand the statutory definition of medical practice to include medical necessity
determinations, see A.B. 794, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997), and to create a new cause of action for
failure by a health plan to exercise ordinary care, see A.B. 977, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997).
97. Several states that are adopting or considering managed care liability laws are also requiring
external appeals of adverse coverage determinations.  See 1997 Conn. Acts 99 § 20 (Reg, Sess.).
However, these laws and regulations do not address medical malpractice, and neither aid in identifying
medical injuries nor help resolve related disputes.
98. The political viability of caps in managed care liability laws is uncertain.  On one hand, most
current state legislation has been drafted by consumer advocates and the trial bar.  On the other hand,
passage of these laws frequently depends on their being palatable to organized medicine and the
insurance industry.
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A.  ERISA
In the absence of federal legislation establishing enterprise liability, state
law claims against managed care organizations typically run up against
ERISA.99  ERISA broadly preempts state laws that “relate to” employee
benefit plans, but does not substitute a clear federal regulatory scheme.100
ERISA preemption of personal injury claims is significant both individually
and in the aggregate.  Approximately sixty percent of non-elderly Americans
receive health coverage through their employers, with the vast majority of
these benefit plans qualified under ERISA.101
ERISA applies not only to employers themselves, but also to a range of
insurance and administrative entities to which employers delegate
responsibility.102  Because of ERISA, persons injured by the conduct of
managed care organizations may be unable to bring causes of action such as
wrongful death, professional negligence, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, or bad faith breach of insurance contract.103  If they decide to sue, they
must do so in federal court, possibly without the benefit of a jury trial.104  Most
importantly, their maximum potential recovery is the value of the health care
benefit wrongfully denied plus attorneys fees in many cases.105  Neither
extracontractual compensatory nor punitive damages may be awarded.106
Because of ERISA’s strict limitations on claims and damages, lawsuits
involving a large subset of injured patients are seldom brought.  The public
policy implications of this depend on one’s overall view of personal injury
                                                          
99. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1461 (1994).  ERISA preemption of personal injury claims has
prompted a spate of recent scholarship.  See, e.g., David H. Sculnick, HMO Liability and ERISA
Preemption for Medical Malpractice, ABA HEALTH LAW., Spring 1996, at 8.
100. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).  Commentators generally refer to this phenomenon as the “ERISA
vacuum.”  See Alan I. Widiss & Lawrence O. Gostin, What’s Wrong with the ERISA “Vacuum”?: The
Case Against Unrestricted Freedom for Employers to Terminate Employee Health Care Plans and to
Decide What Coverage Is to Be Provided When Risk Retention Plans Are Established for Health Care ,
41 DRAKE L. REV. 635 (1992).
101. See John Holahan et al., A Shifting Picture of Health Insurance Coverage, HEALTH AFF., Fall
1995, at 253.
102. See 29 U.S.C. § 1103(21) (1994) (defining fiduciary as a “person who exercises any
discretionary authority or discretionary control in the management of the plan or the management or
disposition of the plan’s assets”).
103. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
104. See Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1985); In re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318 (8th
Cir. 1982); Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1980); Wardle v. Central States, 627 F.2d 820
(7th Cir. 1980).
105. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a),(g)(1) (1994) (stating that beneficiary may “recover benefits due to
him under the terms of his plan, … enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or … clarify his
rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan”; and that the court may award a “reasonable
attorney’s fee and costs of action to either party”).
106. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 260 (1993) (stating that provision in § 502(a) of
ERISA allowing “appropriate equitable relief” does not permit award of money damages);
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985) (holding that extracontractual
damages are not available in § 409(a) action).  Lost wages, however, may be recoverable as equitable
relief.  See Hemelt v. United States, 122 F.3d 204, 209-10 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that “[b]y holding that
ERISA section 502(a)(3) only permits equitable relief, of which lost wages and other economic harms
are a major component, Mertens reinforces our conclusion that the settlement payments at issue here
are wages”).
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litigation in health care.  To the extent that medical litigation is hopelessly
flawed as a compensatory mechanism, ERISA preemption undoubtedly
conserves administrative expense.  However, any potential deterrent effect of
litigation on managed care organizations is lost as well.107  Even more
problematic is the fact that similarly situated patients in terms of the
circumstances and extent of their injuries have vastly different legal rights and
remedies.
Prior to 1995, courts evaluating claims against managed care organizations
for medical injuries were effectively handcuffed by what was then thought to be
ERISA’s uniquely broad preemptive reach.108  In ruling against a very
sympathetic plaintiff in Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc.,109 for example, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals resigned itself to the fact that “[t]he result
ERISA compels us to reach means that the Corcorans have no remedy, state or
federal, for what may have been a serious mistake.”110
Among other things, judicial solidarity upholding preemption induced
plaintiffs’ lawyers to look for more subtle approaches that did not constitute
frontal assaults on ERISA.  One strategy has been to identify causes of action
under federal laws that coexist with ERISA and that either apply more lenient
standards for liability or allow more generous remedies.  For example, lawsuits
based on benefits determinations that involve hospitals may include claims for
relief under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
(“EMTALA”),111 which was enacted to prevent “patient dumping” for
economic reasons.112  In addition, suits for denials of benefits have been brought
alleging gender-based discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 or disability-based discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”).113  Some of these cases have generated rulings whose breadth
calls into question efforts to design clinically cost-effective benefits.  In
                                                          
107. Defensive medicine seems less a concern for managed care organizations because, unlike
physicians receiving fee-for-service payment, they generally have strong financial incentives not to
overtreat.
108. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust., 463 U.S. 1, 25 n.26 (1983)
(discussing ERISA’s “virtually unique preemption provision”), quoted in Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,
463 U.S. 85, 98 n.15 (1983).
109. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
110. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1338.  Despite the softening of preemption discussed below, courts still
find themselves in ethically unsatisfactory situations because of ERISA.  See Andrews-Clarke v.
Travelers Ins. Co., No. 97-10191-WGY, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17390, at *11-12 (D. Mass. Oct. 30,
1997) (dismissing claim, but commenting that “under traditional notions of justice, the harms alleged…
should entitle [the plaintiff] to some legal remedy,” and calling the outcome required by ERISA
“ridiculous”).
111. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1994).
112. See, e.g., Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937 (6th Cir. 1995) (involving suicide of
patient allegedly denied treatment for mental illness and substance abuse).
113. A Title VII plaintiff must first file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”).  If the EEOC decides that there is “reasonable cause” to believe the
allegation of discrimination is true, it may prosecute the case itself.  If it decides not to prosecute the
case, it issues a “right-to-sue letter” entitling the plaintiff to pursue the case privately.  See 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5 (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28 (1997).
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Henderson v. Bodine Aluminum Corp.,114 for example, a federal appeals court
suggested that the ADA prohibits employers from covering a given treatment
for some underlying conditions but not for others.115
Moreover, the effect of ERISA on managed care liability is currently in
flux.116  Courts are finding new meaning in ERISA’s existing provisions and
Congress is considering significant amendments to liberalize claims and
recoveries for injured patients.  Courts are also pushing the limits of recent
Supreme Court decisions, concluding that medical malpractice is beyond the
direct preemptive scope of ERISA and assessing liability against managed care
organizations.117  Unfortunately, this liberalization of ERISA preemption does
not necessarily equate to a rational application of enterprise liability principles.
1.  Distinguishing Coverage and Care.  ERISA jurisprudence in the medical
arena is ultimately about drawing an increasingly elusive line between coverage
and care.  Because of ERISA’s preemptive reach, if a patient’s predicament is
deemed to arise from a benefit determination, little legal recourse may be
available.  If merely a treatment decision is implicated, rights and remedies
may be far more generous.  However, the pegs in actual disputes seldom fit
neatly into these holes.  Consequently, although courts sometimes achieve
rough justice in individual cases by hammering away at the distinction, their
                                                          
114. 70 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 1995).
115. The court concluded that “if the evidence shows that a given treatment is non-experimental …
and the plan provides the treatment for other conditions directly comparable to the one at issue, the
denial of treatment arguably violates the ADA.”  Id. at 960.  This language stands in contrast to an
influential pre-ADA ruling, McGann v. H&H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), which upheld an
ERISA plan’s decision to convert from insured to self-insured status in order to substantially restrict
coverage for AIDS.  Other courts have declined to apply the ADA to coverage decisions.  See Parker
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (holding that the ADA does not
prohibit an employer from adopting a long-term disability plan containing longer benefits for
employees who become disabled due to physical illness than for those who become disabled due to
mental illness); cf. Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that
exclusion from coverage of fertility treatments does not violate the ADA because infertility is not a
covered disability).  However, the Supreme Court recently held that even nonvested benefits such as
health coverage are subject to the prohibition on discrimination contained in § 510 of ERISA, as long
as the plaintiff can prove unlawful intent.  See Inter-Modal Rail Employees Ass’n v. Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe Ry. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1513 (1997); see also Maxwell J. Mehlman et al., When Do Health Care
Decisions Discriminate Against Persons with Disabilities?, 22 J. HEALTH, POL., POL’Y & L. 1385
(1997); David Orentlicher, Destructuring Disability: Rationing of Health Care and Unfair
Discrimination Against the Sick, 31 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 49 (1996).
116. Nonetheless, ERISA preemption has continued vitality with respect to other state legislation
affecting managed care, such as any-willing-provider laws.  See CIGNA Healthplan v. Louisiana ex rel.
Ieyoub, 82 F.3d 642 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that any-willing-provider law is preempted).  The
direction of ERISA preemption regarding claims under more general fair trade practices laws is less
clear.  See Napoletano v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 680 A.2d 127 (Conn. 1996) (stating that state law
claims by terminated providers and their patients are not preempted); Margaret G. Farrell, ERISA
Preemption and Regulation of Managed Health Care: The Case for Managed Federalism, 23 AM. J.L. &
MED. 251 (1997).
117. On the other hand, the recent Texas enactment imposing malpractice liability on managed
care organizations has been challenged under ERISA, and similar cases can be expected elsewhere
See Corporate Health Ins. v. Texas Dept. of Ins., No. H-97-2072 (U.S. Dist. Ct., Houston, Tex. 1997);
Linda O. Prager, Aetna Challenges Texas Law Lifting HMOs’ ERISA Shield, AM. MED. NEWS, July
21, 1997, at 1, 25.  Of course, if the law in fact purported to do what the article’s headline claims,
Aetna’s challenge undoubtedly would succeed.
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increasingly strained reasoning is unlikely to offer a long-term solution to the
problem of medical injury in managed care.
When insurance organizations were distinct from health care providers, it
was easy enough to distinguish the decision to deliver a service from the
decision to pay for it.  The former was potentially a medical malpractice case;
the latter an insurance coverage case or, given ERISA’s broad preemptive
scope and restrictive remedies, no case at all.
Managed care has challenged these assumptions.  Today, it is difficult to
separate the payment from the service function in health coverage.  Because
managed care requires preauthorization for hospitalization, surgery, and other
expensive services, denial of payment is often tantamount to denial of care.118
Vertical integration—whether through common ownership or contractual
affiliation—further blurs the distinction.  Closed-panel HMOs are virtually
useless to patients who are denied benefits, while contractual affiliations
between insurers and providers may result in situations where coverage
considerations influence clinical recommendations by individual physicians.119
Gatekeeping restrictions on specialist referrals arguably compound many of
these problems.120
Not only are whole organizations functionally integrated, but individual
participants often perform several roles.121  For example, insurance regulations
and professional conventions have led insurers to place considerable weight on
contractual exclusions for “experimental,” “investigational,” or “medically
unnecessary” treatment.  These are largely clinical judgments requiring
professional expertise.122  At the same time, medical groups, by subcontract
                                                          
118. Even in fee-for-service practice, courts evaluated payment cases with the understanding that,
in the less-than-universal American health care system, failure to finance care sometimes meant
failure to receive it.
119. See deMeurers v. Health Net, No. 239338 (Riverside Cty. Super. Ct., Dec. 13, 1995) (approving
arbitration award of $1.3 million given evidence that HMO had pressured physician to change
recommendation regarding treatment for breast cancer).  Explicit “gag clauses” in managed care
contracts, though probably seldom invoked in practice to restrict communication of clinical
information or prohibit disclosure of non-covered alternatives, appear to have met their demise
through legislation or voluntary action under its threat.  See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
MANAGED CARE: EXPLICIT GAG CLAUSES NOT FOUND IN HMO CONTRACTS, BUT PHYSICIAN
CONCERNS REMAIN, (1997); see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 1056.1 (West 1997); GA. CODE
ANN. § 33-20A-7 (1997); IND. CODE § 27-13-15-1(a) (1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 4303(3)
(West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.13-3 (1996); WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.075 (1997).
120. See supra text accompanying note 78.  Point-of-service plans and broad networks of providers
have alleviated this concern to some degree, as has the decline of gatekeeping.
121. A fascinating fictional dialogue exploring the tension between individual and group health
management can be found in David M. Eddy, Broadening the Responsibilities of Practitioners: The
Team Approach, 269 JAMA 1849 (1993).
122. One legislative trend is to subject these decisions to independent professional review.  See
A.B. 1663, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996) (codified as amended at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
1370.4 (West 1997), CAL. INS. CODE § 10145.3 (West 1997)).  Notice that it is easier to impose an
independent review requirement on medical necessity judgments than on utilization management
decisions as a whole, because many of the latter have contractual rather than purely clinical
determinants.  See 1997 Conn. Acts 99 § 20 (Reg. Sess.) (providing for two-stage review by insurance
commissioner and medical experts); see also S. 5489, 220th Leg. (N.Y. 1997) (establishing independent
treatment review organizations for the purpose of making recommendations regarding health
insurance coverage in certain instances).
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from insurers, sometimes rule on the availability of services under subscriber
policies.123
The importance of ERISA to liability exposure is likely to bring many of
these tough cases to court, especially since ERISA is a potential shield for
individual physicians if they qualify as “plan fiduciaries.”  However, plan
fiduciaries have obligations to beneficiaries that may not be congruent with
physicians’ usual duties to patients.  In particular, disclosure of conflicts of
interest under ERISA may be stricter than under state informed consent
laws.124
2.  Reinterpreting ERISA After Travelers.  In 1995, the United States
Supreme Court decided New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.125  The Court held that New York’s hospital
surcharge program had merely an indirect effect on employer costs that was not
sufficiently substantial to relate to ERISA plans and therefore was not
preempted.126  This was a dramatic departure from prior case law.127  Lower
courts quickly took Travelers as an indication that ERISA preemption was no
longer absolute, even in individual personal injury cases that were very
different in posture and character from state legislative efforts to impose
substantive regulations on ERISA plans.128
                                                          
123. Theoretically, physicians performing intermediate functions between coverage and care risk
unpredictable liability exposure.  On the one hand, benefits responsibilities delegated under ERISA
may allow physicians to invoke ERISA preemption.  On the other hand, liability for nonclinical tasks
may be excluded from physicians’ malpractice coverage and may not be subject to state law limits on
recovery.
124. See infra text accompanying note 199.
125. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
126. An interesting question raised by the Travelers decision is that, apart from the formal
difference of their application to premiums rather than hospital charges, state premium taxes also
exert purely economic effects of similar magnitudes (and do so for the similar purpose of supporting
uncompensated care).  Yet such laws clearly are preempted by ERISA as applied to self-funded
employers.  One wonders if the flight of employers toward self-insurance (coupled with the rapid
growth of stop-loss insurance) persuaded the Court to rethink its position.
Travelers also lists three categories of state laws that generally remain preempted: mandated
benefits, mandated administrative requirements such as data reporting, and alternative enforcement
mechanisms.  See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 658-62.  The reference to enforcement derives from wrongful
termination laws, not causes of action for medical malpractice.  See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon,
498 U.S. 133 (1990).  Nonetheless, courts construing personal injury claims as not preempted by
ERISA must step carefully around this third group.
127. Prior health care cases involving state mandated benefits and other consumer protection or
uncompensated care funding strategies generally were litigated over ERISA’s insurance savings
clause.  See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (holding that
mandated benefit law is preempted only as applied to self-insured employers).  Travelers cut the
inquiry short by avoiding even a threshold finding of relatedness.  See also DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA
Med. and Clinical Servs. Fund, 117 S. Ct. 1747 (1997) (finding that surcharge is not preempted as
applied to treatment centers owned and operated by ERISA plan).
128. The Supreme Court’s decision in Travelers also took pressure off Congress to amend ERISA
by giving courts additional flexibility in tough cases.  Despite the difficulties caused by ERISA
preemption, the law was a political can of worms that Congress had been reluctant to reopen.  At the
same time, the lower court decisions in the case had put New York State’s hospitals in financial
jeopardy.  See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708 (2d Cir. 1994), aff’g and rev’g in part 813 F.
Supp. 996 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).  While the case was on certiorari, Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan came to
SAGE4.FMT 04/01/98  8:11 AM
Page 159: Spring 1997] MANAGED CARE LIABILITY 185
Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc.,129 a 1995 Third Circuit ruling, is frequently
cited for the proposition that, after Travelers, medical malpractice claims
against managed care organizations are not necessarily preempted by
ERISA.130  The case arose from the alleged negligent failure to diagnose and
treat high blood sugar, which led to a patient’s death.  Claims were brought
against several physicians, two hospitals, and, under a theory of ostensible
agency for the actions of the physicians, the decedent’s HMO.  U.S. Healthcare
removed the case to federal court, and requested dismissal of the claims against
it as preempted by ERISA.  However, the federal district court refused to hear
the case and returned it to state court for further proceedings, citing several
differences between the Dukes’s allegations and a claim for benefits under
ERISA.
In reaching its conclusion, the court distinguished the existence of benefits,
which it considered within the purview of the Dukes’s ERISA plan, from the
quality of benefits, which it did not.  Because the participating doctor’s alleged
malpractice was an issue of quality, the court ruled that a suit against U.S.
Healthcare based on apparent agency was not a claim under the Dukes’s
employee benefit plan and therefore was not completely preempted.131
Although this reasoning allowed the court to avoid curtailing the remedies
potentially available to the plaintiff, it is less generalizable than is usually
recognized.  The court did not regard quality as an inappropriate subject for an
ERISA plan, but held only that the Dukes’s plan failed to address it.  As the
court observed, “we also recognize the possibility that an ERISA plan may
describe a benefit in terms that can accurately be described as related to the
quality of the service.”132  Presumably, if the plan document had specified the
standard of care, a suit based on lack of compliance with the plan would be a
                                                          
the rescue.  In a stunning display of naked political power, a provision appeared in the annual budget
reconciliation bill revoking the tax deductibility of health benefits for New York employers who
refused to pay the supposedly unlawful state surcharges.  See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act,
Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13442, 107 Stat. 312, 568 (1993) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 162(n)
(1994)).
129. 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995).
130. See Darryl van Duch, New Danger for HMOs, NAT’L L.J., May 13, 1996, at A1 (observing that
the Dukes trend constitutes “judicial enterprise liability”).  The actual holding of the case is more
limited.  The federal court to which the case had been removed found only that removal was improper
because the Dukes’s claim was not one for redress under ERISA itself.  It was therefore not
“completely preempted,” meaning that it did not present a federal question subject under ERISA to
exclusive federal jurisdiction.  The judge sent the case back to the state court to decide whether state
law claims were in fact preempted which, like the Corcorans, would leave the Dukes without a remedy.
This task may be performed by both state and federal courts.
131.  At least one court appears to have used the distinction between quality and quantity of benefits
to deny complete preemption even for the direct actions of the managed care organization in selecting
physicians and instituting utilization review policies.  See Kampmeier v. Sacred Heart Hosp., No. 95-
7816, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5739 (E.D. Pa. May 1, 1996); see also Pappas v. Asbel, 675 A.2d 711, 716
(Pa. Super. Ct.), appeal granted by 686 A.2d 1312 (Pa. 1996) (holding there was no preemption of claim
that HMO negligently delayed authorizing patient transfer because claims at issue had no connection
to benefit scheme Congress sought to protect through ERISA).
132. See Dukes, 57 F.3d at 358.
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claim under ERISA and would be preempted.133  Whether anything in ERISA
itself precludes such a provision is an unanswered question, but the basic
holding in McGann v. H&H Music Co. suggests not.134
Since the Dukes case, several courts have held that if a managed care
organization’s liability is derivative of a physician’s—by virtue of respondeat
superior, ostensible agency, or similar doctrines—the same degree of
preemption should apply to each defendant.135  Therefore, these courts have
concluded that suits against managed care organizations for acts of malpractice
committed by participating physicians either are not claims under ERISA
removable to federal court or do not “relate to” an employee benefit plan at
all.136
This conclusion undoubtedly serves the interests of injured patients and
their attorneys.  As managed care grows, even unsystematic incidents of
possible malpractice will be linkable through association with umbrella
organizations such as insurers.  These organizations will frequently be large,
well-capitalized entities with marginal reputations among either the public or
the medical community—in other words, ideal deep pockets.  Moreover, in
today’s competitive environment, aggressive advertising and marketing
practices usually will provide enough evidence of apparent agency to survive
summary judgment.137
Unfortunately, favoring vicarious over direct claims is somewhat illogical.
In the absence of ERISA, malpractice claims against managed care
                                                          
133. For a discussion of private contracting regarding the standard of care, see Richard A. Epstein,
Medical Malpractice, Imperfect Information, and the Contractual Foundation for Medical Services, 49
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 201 (Spring 1986) (discussing contractual standards of liability).
134. See McGann., 946 F.2d 401.  Even in the absence of benefit language setting forth the standard
of care, the Dukes approach is problematic.  For example, the court qualified its dichotomy between
existence and quality with the comment that circumstances might arise in which the quality of care was
so poor as to constitute constructive denial of a benefit.  See Dukes, 57 F.3d at 358.  However, this
would have the counterintuitive effect of immunizing the plan from damages when quality was
abysmal, while exposing it when quality was merely substandard.
135. There are no reported cases holding that a malpractice claim against a physician is preempted
merely because the patient received employer-sponsored health coverage.  As physicians assume more
responsibility for managing the health of populations, often under risk-bearing contracts, physicians
may both desire and deserve to assert rights under ERISA.
136. See Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding vicarious liability claim against
insurer for actions of preferred provider not completely preempted); Pacificare Inc. v. Burrage, 59
F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995) (approving remand to state court of vicarious liability claim against HMO for
malpractice of primary care physician); Lancaster v.  Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 958 F. Supp.
1137 (E.D. Va. 1997) (holding vicarious liability claim for negligent care prompted by practice
guidelines and cost standards not preempted); Edelen v. Osterman, 943 F. Supp. 75, 76 (D.D.C. 1996)
(stating that malpractice claim involving physician employed by HMO has “too tenuous a relationship
to employee benefit plan” to be preempted); Howard v. Sasson, No. CIV.A.95-0068, 1995 WL 581960
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 1995) (stating that vicarious liability claim against HMO for actions of pediatrician is
not removable to federal court).  But see Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, 88 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir.
1996) (holding that, because determining the relationship between defendant HMO and participating
surgeon required examining the employee benefit plan, a vicarious liability claim against the HMO
based on the surgeon’s negligence was completely preempted).
137. Some Blue Cross plans are riding the current wave of suspicion regarding managed care by
advertising that “[w]e want to be your health plan, not your doctor.”  However, marketing
representations as to the quality of the doctors affiliated with health plans are probably inevitable.
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organizations typically would include allegations of direct malfeasance such as
inadequate credentialing of participating physicians, faulty oversight of referral
patterns, imposition of substandard practice guidelines, and negligent
utilization review.  Under prevailing law since Dukes, however, ERISA will
generally preempt these direct claims while allowing vicarious claims based on
a far lower degree of moral culpability to proceed.138
Beyond the ethical absurdity of this distinction, there will be situations
where factually separating direct and vicarious claims is impossible.  Does it
make sense to allow a patient injured by a bad doctor in a bargain-basement
network to recover damages from the organization that selected the doctor on
the theory that the doctor was bad—but not on the theory that the selection was
bad?  What about an informed consent claim based on failure to disclose
financial incentives that influence care decisions?139  Can a health plan logically
be held vicariously liable for the effect on physician-patient communications of
its compensation structure when it could not be held directly liable for the
compensation structure itself?
A few cases, including Dukes, have suggested that even direct claims may
not be preempted if they involve allegations of negligent selection of physicians
or negligent imposition of financial incentives, rather than negligent utilization
review.140  These decisions typically reason that inquiries into the contractual
relationship between ERISA plans and providers do not require examination
of the plan document, and therefore are not claims under ERISA.  There are
two difficulties with this logic.  First, ERISA’s fiduciary duty requirements
probably require disclosure of financial incentives and other aspects of the
                                                          
138. States are pushing the envelope to challenge benefit determinations as well.  For example,
professional licensing boards in many states are asserting disciplinary authority over medical directors
of health plans and other health professionals employed by managed care organizations in
administrative capacities.  Courts are divided as to the legitimacy of this approach, and it remains
unclear whether such actions are preempted by ERISA.  In the first case to be litigated, an Arizona
appeals court upheld the issuance of an “advisory letter of concern” to the medical director of a large
HMO for wrongfully denying coverage for laparoscopic cholecystectomy.  See Murphy v. Arizona Bd.
of Med. Exam’rs, 949 P.2d 530 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).  But see Morris v. District of Columbia Bd. of
Med., 701 A.2d 364 (D.C. Ct. App. 1997) (concluding that Blue Cross medical director was not
“practicing medicine” so as to require local licensure).
139. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990) (holding that consent
for medical procedure was impaired by physician’s financial interest in research from procedure);
D.A.B. v. Brown, 570 N.W.2d 168 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that claim that physicians failed to
disclose payments from drug company to prescribe Protropin was untimely because it should have
been brought under informed consent law); see also Jury Rejects $13.5 Million Lawsuit Against HMO,
JOURNAL RECORD, Oct. 3, 1996, at 3 (describing Gross v. Prudential  Health Care Plan, No. CJ-
9474267 (Okla. Cty. Ct. Oct. 1, 1996), denying summary judgment against University of Oklahoma
professor who claimed his doctor and HMO tried to “maximize profits and bonuses by denying him”
care).  Construing informed consent this broadly is a departure from current law in many states, which
limits the doctrine to invasive procedures and imposes strict standards of causation.  See, e.g., N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 1997).
140. See, e.g., Dukes, 57 F.3d at 360-61 (stating that “only in a utilization-review role is an entity in
a position to deny benefits due under an ERISA welfare plan”); Ouellette v. Christ Hosp., 942 F. Supp.
1160 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (suit against health insurer alleging malpractice based on hospital financial
incentives not completely preempted).
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plan-provider relationship.141  Second, any-willing-provider laws and other
restrictions on provider contracting have been held to relate to employee
benefit plans.142  All in all, courts drawing a distinction between utilization
review and other care management practices seem to be fixated on traditional
models of insurer behavior, which begs the question of ERISA’s role in today’s
more complex health care system.
It is also worth considering how judicial decisions, if they continue to follow
Dukes, might influence the structural choices and management strategies of
managed care organizations.  Certainly, as suggested by the Dukes court,
managed care organizations may be able to insulate themselves from liability
by specifying the standard of care in subscriber contracts.  However, because a
change of that magnitude would affect both health plan marketability and
physician relations, one hardly would expect it to occur in the near future.
Nonetheless, other, less visible aspects of plan design and administration
might be equally useful to risk management.  Specifically, from a liability
perspective, rule-based cost containment may be preferable to delegated
authority using incentive compensation.  For example, clinical practice
parameters and strict prospective and concurrent utilization review seem more
likely to remain shielded from liability by ERISA.  Yet these tools may lead to
worse quality care than incentive structures that allow physicians to continue
their traditional practice of collegial consultation and to adhere to established
ethical precepts.
B.  Tort Reform Laws
Because the availability of damages is central to the cost and effectiveness
of any tort system, another important question affecting both physicians
performing care management tasks and managed care organizations is the
extent to which state legislative limitations on medical malpractice suits will
apply to managed care.143  When traditional tort reforms such as caps on
noneconomic and punitive damages were enacted in the 1970s and 1980s, the
determination of who was a “health care provider” and what constituted a
“health care service” was straightforward.  For example, California’s MICRA
statute applies broadly to actions “arising out of the professional negligence of
a health care provider,”144 but it does not govern negligence in non-
professional services.145
Things are no longer as certain.  The Virginia Supreme Court recently ruled
                                                          
141. See infra text accompanying note 199.
142. See supra note 116.  These holdings do not affect findings of “complete preemption” in tort
cases, but nonetheless bear on whether pendant state claims are available.
143. See Thomas D. Price, Liability for Negligence in Managed Health Care: Problems of Allocation
and Prevention, CAL. HEALTH L. NEWS, Spring 1992, at 8-10.
144. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.13(a) (West 1997); see also Central Pathology Serv. Med. Clinic
v. Superior Court, 832 P.2d 924, 926 (Cal. 1992) (holding that a negligent pap smear by a pathology
laboratory was subject to MICRA).
145. See Andrea N. v. Laurelwood Convalescent Hosp., 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 894 (Cal. 1993) (holding
that MICRA does not apply to damages for rape caused by poor security).
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that the state’s $1 million cap on damages does not protect a practice
management corporation held jointly and severally liable with its physician-
owner.146  Even issues as seemingly clear as hospital liability for a medical error
may become muddied.  Because theories of institutional quality improvement
often focus on administrative processes, a medical injury might be construed as
a failure of such processes rather than the result of faulty professional
judgment.147
Finally, personal injury suits are based increasingly on causes of action
other than professional negligence.  For example, courts have divided as to
whether damages recovered from a hospital in a suit under EMTALA are
subject to MICRA’s $250,000 cap.148  Federal fraud and abuse laws also are
being applied to situations involving patient injury.  For instance, to the extent
that liability under the federal False Claims Act becomes applicable to poor
quality managed care, state tort reforms would be entirely irrelevant to the
calculation of damages.149
C.  Dispute Resolution
An evolving area of law with important implications for enterprise liability
relates to the enforceability and regulation of alternative dispute resolution
systems.150  As discussed previously, part of the rationale for enacting
enterprise liability in connection with national health care reform was the
concurrent imposition of a system for registering grievances, coupled with a less
adversarial and, one hopes, less costly forum for resolving disputes.151  The goal
of this design was to encourage a greater percentage of injuries to be reviewed
than occurs in conventional litigation, without greater overall expense.
Traditionally, mandatory arbitration of personal injury claims was often
held invalid as an impermissible legislative limitation on constitutional rights to
due process and trial by jury, or because it had been imposed by medical
providers in adhesion contracts.152  Over the past decades, however,
                                                          
146. See Schwartz v. Brownlee, 482 S.E.2d 827 (Va. 1997).  These decisions have implications for
market organization.  For example, even in states that allow the corporate practice of medicine,
liability concerns lead most physician practice management companies to control individual practices
by contract rather than by outright stock ownership.  See PRICE WATERHOUSE, GIVING STRUCTURE
AND BALANCE TO PPM TRANSACTIONS: GUIDE TO ACCOUNTING AND TAX ISSUES FUNDAMENTAL
TO TODAY’S PPM TRANSACTIONS 5 (2d ed. 1997).  However, contractual control is less efficient, and
raises accounting, securities law, bankruptcy, and other issues.
147. See infra text accompanying notes 179-87.
148. Compare Barris v. County of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. App. 4th 471, 483 (1997) (holding that
“[s]tabilizing a patient is ‘inextricably woven’ with a hospital’s professional duty”) with Jackson v. East
Bay Hosp., 980 F. Supp. 1341 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that EMTALA is not a medical malpractice
law subject to MICRA).
149. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (1994).
150. See Thomas B. Metzloff, Alternative Dispute Resolution Strategies in Medical Malpractice, 9
ALASKA L. REV. 429 (1992).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 28-40.
152. See Clark C. Havighurst, Private Reform of Tort-Law Dogma: Market Opportunities and Legal
Obstacles, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143 (Spring 1986); see also Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 443 (Cal. 1963).
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legislatures and courts have become more receptive to structured alternatives
to litigation that provide cost-effective dispute resolution, even if they reduce
access to the courts.  For example, courts now generally uphold agreements to
undergo binding arbitration as long as they comply with state statutory
requirements.153  Consequently, managed care organizations—particularly
closed-panel entities that acknowledge their influence on medical decisions—
increasingly include in their insurance contracts arbitration provisions for both
insurance coverage and medical malpractice cases.154
With managed care growing rapidly, these practices are attracting
regulatory scrutiny.  Most states, and the federal government under Medicare,
have recently adopted regulations for the handling of coverage disputes
between managed care organizations and their subscribers.155  Several such
laws require advisory or binding review by independent entities.156  The effect
of this trend on dispute resolution for medical malpractice is uncertain.
Independent review arguably reduces bias; however, it also imposes additional
costs and limits the ability of managed care organizations to construct optimal
internal processes.
Courts also are addressing dispute resolution, most frequently in cases
where consumers challenge the legality or applicability of arbitration clauses.
For example, in Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group,157 the California
Supreme Court ruled that Kaiser Permanente’s failure to comply with the
promised terms of arbitration might allow the plaintiff to avoid mandatory
arbitration of his malpractice suit.158  At the same time, however, the California
                                                          
153. See Morris v. Metriyakool, 344 N.W.2d 736 (Mich. 1984).
154. Kaiser’s arbitration system is well known, but data on its operation have been closely guarded
until recently.  One might speculate that Kaiser pays more claims than its competitors (though in
smaller amounts and with fewer transaction costs), which would not necessarily serve the
organization’s public relations interests regarding quality.  An important effect of the Engalla case is to
open some of this information to litigants and, one hopes, researchers.
155. See Medicare Appeals of Individual Claims, 62 Fed. Reg. 25844 (1997) (final rule); 1997 Conn.
Acts 99 §§ 18-23 (Reg. Sess.).  As Medicare increases the percentage of its beneficiaries who are
enrolled in managed care organizations, it will become the principal regulator of many managed care
practices much as it now dominates fee-for-service care.  See Grijalva v. Shalala, 946 F. Supp. 747 (D.
Ariz. 1996) (imposing governmental due process requirements on private health plans that enroll
Medicare beneficiaries).
156. See supra note 122; see also ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CONSUMER PROTECTION AND
QUALITY IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY, CONSUMER BILL OF RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES:
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1997) (available at
<http://www.hcqualitycommission.gov/cborr/consbill.htm> (visited Feb. 23, 1998)) (recommending
detailed internal appeals procedures, plus external review when treatment is denied as experimental,
investigational, or not medically necessary).
157. 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997).
158. Significantly, the court did not overturn Kaiser’s longstanding system of mandatory arbitration
of malpractice and coverage disputes as written, only as applied to the plaintiff.  Nonetheless, the court
allowed the plaintiff to introduce statistical evidence demonstrating Kaiser’s systematic non-
compliance.  Kaiser recently announced plans to reconfigure its arbitration program in accordance
with recommendations of a blue-ribbon panel established in the aftermath of Engalla.  Among other
measures, Kaiser will cede control of the arbitration process to an independent administrator, allow
the use of a single neutral arbitrator, encourage early mediation, set explicit deadlines, and create a
broad advisory panel.  See THE BLUE RIBBON ADVISORY PANEL ON KAISER PERMANENTE
ARBITRATION, THE KAISER PERMANENTE ARBITRATION SYSTEM: A REVIEW AND
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court reiterated its general approval of mandatory arbitration for medical
malpractice claims, a position also being taken by other states.159
Furthermore, recent U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence may prove
important to the arbitration of medical malpractice claims.  In Doctor’s Assocs.,
v. Casarotto,160 the Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts state
laws requiring arbitration agreements to contain elements such as bold-face
type, mandatory disclosure, or rescissionary periods that are not applicable to
other contracts.161  These features are common in consumer regulations
governing arbitration in general and medical malpractice arbitration in
particular.  Consequently, states likely will be constrained as to how they may
promote the efficient but fair resolution of disputes in managed care.
D.  Network Structure
As discussed above, proposals for systematic enterprise liability have been
framed according to two views of the American health care system.162  In the
first, hospitals were the focal point of health care delivery, as well as of
iatrogenic injuries, and could consolidate claims brought against them and their
medical staffs.  In the second, distinct managed care health plans in competition
with one another could balance cost and quality so as to optimize safety and
compensation for their enrollees.  The major problem today is that neither view
reflects the way in which our managed health care system has actually evolved.
Hospitals are increasingly peripheral to basic medical care, while health plans
have fragmented into poorly differentiated and frequently overlapping
networks of providers.
Based perhaps on a Kaiser prototype, the mental image of managed care
has long been a closed-panel, staff- or group-model HMO that either employs
or maintains exclusive contracts with its medical staff, which in turn treats
patients in dedicated hospitals and clinics.  Physicians in these settings tend to
share a common culture and clinical philosophy, which is fostered by the
selection process and reinforced by feedback and training from the parent
organization.  Traditional peer review and quality assurance activities are
carried on easily within a closed-panel HMO’s health facilities.  It is thus
                                                          
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT (1998); Linda O. Prager, Kaiser Will Turn Arbitration Over
to Neutral Party, AM. MED. NEWS, Feb. 2, 1998, at 3, 20.
159. See Buraczynski v. Eyring, 919 S.W.2d 314 (Tenn. 1996); Robert J. Will, Arbitration of Medical
Malpractice Claims: A Practical Update, ABA HEALTH LAWYER, Winter 1996, at 14.  But see
Broughton v. CIGNA Healthplans, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 558 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding that plan may not
compel arbitration of complaint under California Consumers Legal Remedies Act for deceptive
advertising arising from medical injury because remedies under Act may not be waived).
160. 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996).  Despite its name, the case has nothing to do with medicine.  Doctor’s
Associates franchises fast-food restaurants.
161. The Court in Casarotto overturned a Montana law requiring notice of mandatory arbitration to
appear in underlined capital letters on the first page of contracts.  On the other hand, the Court held
that general state law defenses to contract formation or enforcement, including unconscionability, may
be applied to arbitration agreements notwithstanding the federal enactment.  See id., at 1656-57.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 14-27.
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feasible to centralize grievance and dispute resolution processes, and to
coordinate legal defenses.  Although network-model organizations quickly
emerged in the marketplace as competitive alternatives to closed-panel HMOs,
advances in telecommunications and information processing suggested that this
“virtual integration” would be able to capture the same synergies as physical
integration, perhaps even at lower cost.
Theories of national health care reform based on managed competition
bolstered this view of the consolidated, integrated health plan.  Managed
competition envisioned tightly controlled, “brand-name” organizations
competing with one another based on price and quality of service.163  It was
expected that these entities would procure the loyalty of select physicians
through employment or long-term contract, inviting participation based on
cost-effective practice style.164  Dissemination of carefully developed practice
guidelines, coordination of treatment through primary care physician
gatekeepers, and assembly of multidisciplinary care teams would add to
uniformity.  Moreover, hospitals and academic health centers promised to play
major roles as anchors of integrated delivery systems, importing facility-based
strategies for quality and accountability into managed care.  Anticipating these
trends, it seemed only logical for health plans to bear primary legal
responsibility for adverse events caused by their medical management.
However, the reality of competition in managed care has not turned out to
be discrete, competitive health plans with carefully selected provider panels.
Instead, managed care in most markets consists of broad, overlapping
contractual networks of physicians, hospitals, and other providers.165  The
umbrella managed care organization—bearing the brand name—performs
primarily marketing, enrollment, and claims processing services.  To the extent
it even exists, “care management” consists of negotiating fees with providers,
shifting risk to providers using financial incentives, and subcontracting
utilization review to provider organizations or other entities.
There are several explanations for this trend.  Most of all, the mantra of
“choice” has become a dominant element in the political rhetoric of health care
reform and, by extension, of managed care consumerism.166  As a result, health
                                                          
163. See Alain C. Enthoven, The History and Principles of Managed Competition, HEALTH AFF.,
Supp. 1993, at 24.
164. Even this idealized vision, of course, recognized issues relating to risk-selection and other
obstacles to constructive competition.  See Sandra Shewry et al., Risk Adjustment: The Missing Piece of
Market Competition, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1996, at 171; Shoshanna Sofaer, Informing and Protecting
Consumers Under Managed Competition, HEALTH AFF., Supp. 1993, at 76.
165. See Robert A. Berenson, Beyond Competition, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 171; Jon
Gabel, Ten Ways HMOs Have Changed During the 1990s, HEALTH AFF., May-June 1997, at 134.
Current trends are away from closed panels and gatekeeping.  In 1988, 71% of insured workers were
still in fee-for-service plans, with 18% in HMOs and 11% in PPOs.  By 1991, fee-for-service had
shrunk to 42%, with 26% in HMOs, 22% in PPOs and 10% in point-of-service plans.  Since then,
however, PPOs have grown to 31% and point-of-service to 17%, all at the expense of fee-for-service
(which has dwindled to 18%), while HMOs have increased more slowly to 33%.  See Peter T. Kilborn,
Workers Getting Greater Freedom in Health Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1997, at A1.
166. See Karen Davis et al., Choice Matters: Enrollees’ Views of Their Health Plans, HEALTH AFF.,
Summer 1995, at 99.
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plans recruiting new subscriber groups, particularly those previously enrolled in
indemnity insurance, advertise the size of their provider panels as a rough
surrogate for quality.167  Furthermore, offering members the opportunity to
remain with “their doctor” after joining a health plan reduces the number of
transitional problems and improves performance in satisfaction surveys.
Another reason for the breadth of managed care networks is that health
plans have been able to control premium growth, and therefore to satisfy
employers and other purchasers, even without highly selective contracting.168
This has been possible because of substantial preexisting capacity in acute care
hospital beds and specialist physician services, allowing health plans to
negotiate significant price concessions with a large number of providers.  Even
traditional closed-panel HMOs like Kaiser Foundation Health Plan are farming
out services to other facilities at favorable rates.169
Physician panic also has contributed to lack of network selectivity.  Both
specialists and primary care physicians have entered into contracts with
managed care organizations almost indiscriminately, granting deep price
discounts without any explicit assurance of patient volume.  Consequently,
most physicians are currently affiliated with many more health plans than
would be predicted simply by population or referral base.170  In many cases,
negotiated rates are so low that health plans have been able to eliminate
primary care gatekeeping requirements, conferring on their products yet
another choice-based marketing advantage.171
Finally, regulation has reinforced this trend by limiting the selectivity of
provider networks.  Subject to ERISA preemption, many states have enacted
any-willing-provider statutes, which permit providers to affiliate as they choose,
or freedom-of-choice laws, which allow consumers to consult without
restrictions.172  Women in several parts of the country have won the right to
visit ob-gyn physicians without a referral.173  Mandatory point-of-service
                                                          
167. More detailed measures of quality that actually would be useful to consumers have been slow
to develop.  See ALICE G. GOSFIELD, GUIDE TO LEGAL ISSUES IN MANAGED CARE QUALITY 189-
213 (1996); Susan Edgman-Levitan & Paul D. Cleary, What Information Do Consumers Want and
Need? HEALTH AFF., Winter 1996, at 42.
168. With quality still an amorphous concept, most purchasers understandably focus on price, and
premium growth has slowed, and even briefly reversed, during the last four years.  Recently, however,
there are signs that premiums are rising again, probably signaling that the prior decrease reflected
price-based bargaining rather than long-term changes in factors underlying medical inflation.
169. For example, cardiac surgery for Kaiser patients often is performed under contract by
Stanford-UCSF Medical Center.
170. The continued importance of fee-for-service Medicare to most physicians’ practices probably
also has discouraged them from forming exclusive or near-exclusive affiliations with managed care
plans.
171. See Rachel Kreier, HMOs Without Gatekeepers, AM. MED. NEWS, Aug. 5, 1996, at 1, 27.
There are also variations on this theme, such as allowing patients to refer themselves to
multidisciplinary specialty teams based on quality-related information about participating physicians.
See Linda O. Prager, Oxford’s Gambit: Specialist Teams, Doctor-Specific Data, AM. MED. NEWS, May
19, 1997, at 1, 32.
172. For a description of these laws and of other consumer protection initiatives in managed care,
see PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REV. COMM’N, 1997 REPORT TO CONGRESS 235-45 (1997).
173. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.69 (West 1997).
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features for health plans have been enacted in one state and are being
considered elsewhere.174  Legislatures and courts have adopted due process
requirements for physician deselection.175  At the same time, the ease of price
discounting has also eroded health plans’ political resistance to these measures.
Enterprise liability, at least as envisioned by the Clinton Administration in
1993, is not entirely compatible with today’s managed care marketplace.176  As
a practical matter, health plans operating non-selectively have limited incentive
and ability to control the delivery of care.  Physician credentialing may be
relevant in isolated circumstances where unlicensed individuals or persons who
have been adjudged incompetent apply as participating providers, but it is
seldom determinative of cost or quality in a world where panels are non-
selective.  In a health care system dominated by broad networks, most health
plans have found it simpler to promote cost-effectiveness through general
financial incentives and utilization review requirements than through specific
provider reeducation and clinical direction.  In any event, practice guidelines or
other explicit clinical management tools would be inefficient deterrents to
malpractice because physicians have contracts with so many different
organizations.
This environment is also likely to retard private contracting to consolidate
malpractice risk at the health plan level.  A single health plan seldom accounts
for a significant portion of any physician’s patients, increasing the transaction
costs to the health plan of providing malpractice insurance, indemnification, or
a unified malpractice defense, and reducing the value of such arrangements to
the physician.177  Perhaps reflecting this, the most common contractual
arrangements are still ones in which health plans attempt to shed liability, not
assume it, although professional associations and health care attorneys have
successfully discouraged the use of very broad indemnification agreements
favoring health plans.178
                                                          
174. See S. 1150, 54th Leg. (Idaho 1997).  Other states require that health plans offer point-of-
service options.  See H.B. 46, 55th Leg. (Mont. 1997) (codified at 1997 MONT. LAWS 165).
175. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 4803 (McKinney 1997) (establishing standards for managed care
contracting); Potvin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 202 (Ct. App. 1997) (granting right
to fair procedure for physician termination).
176. The use of managed care carve-outs also arguably has limited health plans’ ability to centralize
quality management.  Not only mental health services, but other areas, such as ophthalmologic and
cancer care, may be subcontracted to specialized organizations whose treatment plans rarely are
coordinated with one another.  See Richard G. Frank et al., Risk Contracts in Managed Mental Health
Care, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1995, at 50.  On the other hand, as described below, carve-out providers
may themselves develop effective quality management programs.  See infra text accompanying notes
215-19.
177. As a consequence, only a physician’s individual liability insurer has a risk management
connection to all the physician’s patients.  However, there is much more underwriting capacity in the
insurance markets today than 15 years ago when the first channeling programs were established
between physicians and hospitals.  See supra text accompanying notes 73-74.  Therefore, it still may be
cost-effective for managed care organizations to provide malpractice coverage for affiliated physicians
under certain circumstances.
178. Even before the recent movement to legislate malpractice liability for managed care
organizations, several states prohibited the use of broad indemnification or “hold harmless” provisions
in managed care contracts, usually in response to physician complaints that contractually assumed
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Finally, the transition to managed care has created a disequilibrium in
demand for as well as in supply of health care services.  Although sound data
are scarce, annual turnover in managed care enrollment appears to be high,
both in private insurance (as employers explore competitive alternatives) and
in public programs such as Medicaid (because of strict eligibility criteria).  Until
the market stabilizes, it will be difficult to persuade managed care organizations
to take a long-term view of quality or of relationships with patients, both of
which are integral elements of enterprise liability.
E.  Individual Accountability
A considerable part of the debate over enterprise liability comes down to
the question of the appropriate unit for accountability in modern health care.
Traditionally, control—and therefore blame—rested with individual physicians.
Today, however, there is increasing evidence that most errors in health care
delivery, while human in proximate cause, are ultimately the result of faulty
institutional processes.  In this respect, health care is beginning to mirror other
industries more than adherents to a purely professional model would like to
admit.179
At the same time, the public is still loath to believe that anyone other than a
doctor should be responsible for medical negligence.180  Part of this bias reflects
the mystique that, for both scientific and self-serving reasons, has surrounded
the modern medical profession.  Another part undoubtedly results from the
history of conspiracies, cover-ups, greed, and inertia that, at least in the popular
mind, characterizes the ethics of large, faceless corporations.
In the 1993-94 enterprise liability debate, preconceptions regarding
accountability gave prominence to the question of whether malpractice liability
should be shared between institution and individual, or completely transferred
to the institution.  No compelling logic prevents shared liability.  After all,
passengers on a bus that crashes are free to sue both the driver and the bus
company.181  Nonetheless, the Clinton proposal recommended transferring
liability.  In part, transfer was intended as a symbolic benefit to physicians
(though a completely unappreciated one, as it turned out).  Additionally, it was
seen as a way to dislodge traditional insurance and litigation practices and the
transaction costs, strategic behavior, and defensive risk management that they
                                                          
liability was not covered by their malpractice insurance.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-41-14(g) (1997)
States currently attempting to impose malpractice liability on managed care organizations also are
outlawing broad indemnification provisions in physician contracts, thereby foreclosing an obvious
method of evasion.  See S. 386, 75th Leg. § 88.002(e) (Tex. 1997).
179. See infra text accompanying notes 217-21.
180. According to a recent Harris poll, 95% of patients cited their personal physician as the
individual who can have a positive effect on their safety during care.  At the same time, patients
appeared to discount the role of systems and institutions.  See Medical Mistakes: What Your Patients
Think, AM. MED. NEWS, Oct. 27, 1997, at 19.
181. Of course, unlike a typical doctor, a typical bus driver has neither a personal fortune nor
millions in individual liability insurance.
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generate.
Nonetheless, transferred enterprise liability provides much clearer
incentives for organizational improvement than does individual liability,
particularly when many professionals and facilities typically are involved in the
care of a single patient.182  In addition, industrial error reduction might be
more successful without the scapegoating that invariably accompanies
individual liability.  However, market and regulatory trends apart from liability
laws are reinforcing, rather than dispelling, public biases toward individual
accountability.
Much as choice of physician dominates public debates over access to
treatment in managed care, information about physicians controls discussions
of quality.  For example, reporting systems intended to provide clearinghouse
information about doctors to state regulators and credentialing bodies for
specific purposes are now under pressure to allow use by the general public.183
Massachusetts recently became the first state to place physician disciplinary
histories on-line,184 and even the AMA has opened its practice files to the
public electronically.185  This movement to make physician data widely
available is largely oblivious to the academic debate between traditional “bad
apple” models of quality improvement in medicine and new industrial theories
of “shifting the curve.”186  Instead, it derives from technical advances such as
                                                          
182. More generally, the public may be better protected from incompetent practitioners by the
credentialing, disclosure, and quality management activities of managed care organizations than by
direct government regulation of individual physicians.  In an analogy to enterprise liability, this
reasoning has stimulated interest in institutional licensure as a replacement for individual licensure.
See PEW HEALTH PROFESSIONS COMM’N ET AL., REFORMING HEALTH CARE WORKFORCE
REGULATION: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 12 (1995); William M. Sage &
Linda H. Aiken, Regulating Interdisciplinary Practice, in REGULATION OF THE HEALTHCARE
PROFESSIONS 71 (Timothy S. Jost ed., 1997).
183. Maryland, Florida, Delaware, Colorado, California, Vermont, and Connecticut have all
considered measures to provide individual physicians’ malpractice histories to the public.  See Public
Access to Malpractice Data Proliferating in the States, MEDICINE & HEALTH, Apr. 7, 1997, at 1-2.  The
Medicare PRO program also has proposed making information about physicians publicly available.
See Linda O. Prager, Physicians Leery About PRO Changes, AM. MED. NEWS, Aug. 18, 1997, at 3.
Bills even have been introduced to make public the federal government’s National Practitioner Data
Bank, but as yet none have been enacted.  See, e.g., Health Care Liability Reform and Quality
Assurance Act of 1995, S. 454, 104th Cong., § 203 (recommending study); Health Security Act, H.R.
3600, 103d Cong., § 5005(d) (1993) (allowing public access); see also Health Care Quality
Improvement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3784 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
11101-11152 (1994)).  However, questions have been raised about the quality of information in the
federal databank and its overall effectiveness.  See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH
INFORMATION SYSTEMS: NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK CONTINUES TO EXPERIENCE
PROBLEMS (1993); Lawrence Smarr, A Comparative Assessment of the PIAA Data Sharing Project and
the National Practitioner Data Bank: Policy, Purpose, and Application, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
59 (Winter 1997).
184. See 1996 Mass. Acts 307 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 5 (1997)); Jeffrey P.
Donohue, Developing Issues Under the Massachusetts “Physician Profile” Act, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 115
(1997); Paul Engstrom, Doctor Records Online: Has Massachusetts Let a Genie Out of the Bottle?, 2:11
MED. ON THE NET 1 (1996).  California recently followed Massachusetts, see Linda O. Prager,
California Latest Among States Releasing More Disciplinary Data, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 2, 1998, at 1.
185. AMA, Data Services and Publications <http://www.ama-assn.org/physdata/physrel/physrel.
htm> (visited Oct. 4, 1997).
186. “Bad apple” theories rely on eliminating incompetent physicians, while “curve shifting”
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the Internet and a consumerist generation that is now middle-aged, and as
hungry for information about health care as it once was for data regarding cars
and appliances.187
This is likely a progressive trend in most instances.  Given the goals of
enterprise liability, however, it may be problematic because improvement in
institutional quality generally requires confidentiality and protection from
retaliation to promote event reporting and analysis.  Because they are new, for
example, managed care organizations may have difficulty asserting privileges
and immunities that originally were established for hospitals and other
traditional peer review bodies.188  Moreover, the reputational threat to
individual physicians of widespread publication of adverse events can alter
behavior in unproductive ways.189  Consequently, the National Practitioner
Data Bank and other malpractice reporting mechanisms may need to be
restructured to reflect changes in litigation posture, settlement incentives, and
quality-control activities produced by the imposition of liability on managed
care organizations.  Nonetheless, it will take time and luck to convince today’s
consumers to accept limits on information or constraints on malpractice
litigation in the name of institutional quality improvement.
F.  Liability Insurance
As in many other areas of tort law, the widespread existence of liability
insurance has exerted a marked influence on the compensatory and deterrent
effectiveness of the malpractice system, as well as on the conduct of lawsuits.190
Consequently, the market for malpractice insurance frequently will determine
the feasibility of contractual devices to reapportion liability in managed care,
and will affect the direction and success of legal change.191
                                                          
emphasizes improving every physician’s practice skills, including those at or above the standard of
care.  See Barry R. Furrow, The Changing Role of the Law in Promoting Quality in Health Care: From
Sanctioning Outlaws to Managing Outcomes, 26 HOUS. L. REV. 147 (1989); John E. Rolph et al.,
Malpractice Claims Data as a Quality Improvement Tool: II. Is Targeting Effective?, 266 JAMA 2093
(1991) (favoring systematic quality improvement).  The two approaches are not mutually exclusive—
shifting the curve makes it easier to detect outliers.
187. The author recently noticed a billboard advertisement in California for a physician
information hotline, which asked the health care shopper: “Don’t You Want to Examine Your Doctor
Before He Examines You?”
188. See Lomano v. CIGNA Healthplan, Inc., 582 N.E.2d 1150 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (finding that
HMO does not meet definition of “medical review committee” for purposes of privilege).  But see
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2305.25-2305.252 (West 1997) (reversing Lomano).
189. For example, physicians often insisted upon clauses in managed care contracts allowing them
to be terminated without cause because for-cause terminations must be reported to the National
Practitioner Data Bank.  To physicians’ dismay, these clauses now are being used against them by
managed care organizations.
190. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL
L. REV. 313 (1990).  For example, punitive damages are rare in medical malpractice litigation not only
because of jury sympathy for physicians but because punitive damages often are uninsurable under
law.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 1997); CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 1997).
191. Market exit or threat of exit by commercial malpractice insurers was a prime determinant of
tort reform in the 1970s, and physician-owned mutual insurance companies have been key political and
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One argument in favor of enterprise liability is that corporate organizations
are invariably experience-rated, while physicians are grouped only by class and
location.192  The former arrangement provides a much clearer economic
deterrent to malpractice.193  Many health care institutions also have the
financial wherewithal to self-insure up to high levels of risk, removing any
dilutional effect of insurance on deterrence.
However, inflexibility in the liability insurance markets can be problematic
for novel legal and contractual approaches to malpractice liability.194  Managed
care is already pushing the envelope of traditional malpractice coverage.195  For
example, indemnification provisions in first-generation managed care
agreements between physicians and health plans were often so one-sided that
they constituted contractually assumed liability not covered by malpractice
insurance.  In addition, claims for personal injury in today’s more corporate
health care system sometimes can be brought against physicians in their
capacities as directors, officers, or employers, and potentially can be excluded
from coverage on those grounds.  Finally, managed care requires even “treating
physicians” to perform administrative care management tasks which may
constitute a source of liability beyond the scope of their insurance.
Insurance laws and practices also limit the potential value to physicians of
either mandatory or voluntary reapportionment of liability.  As noted
previously, physician malpractice premiums are not based on patient volume,
so that any residual exposure beyond what is borne by a managed care
organization—resulting perhaps from treating fee-for-service patients not
enrolled in managed care—obviates much of the economic benefit of an
enterprise liability arrangement.  It is also unclear whether plaintiffs’ attorneys
would routinely dismiss individual physicians from suits if a solvent
institutional defendant were available, although Kaiser’s mandatory arbitration
system appears to function in that manner.  Alternatively, institutions might
                                                          
policy actors since that time (including in the defeat of enterprise liability during the Clinton health
care reform debate).  It is possible that political efforts to restrict litigation and limit recovery through
tort reform would be less successful if malpractice insurance premiums were simply part of the
business expenses of large health care organizations.  Historically, the visibility of large dollar costs
nominally borne by individual practitioners, particularly well-regarded physicians in high-risk
specialties, was central to the broad political appeal of malpractice-specific tort reform.
192. See Lori L. Darling, Note, The Applicability of Experience Rating to Medical Malpractice
Insurance, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 255 (1987).
193. The effect of enterprise liability on deterrence apart from payment of damages is debatable.
Individual physicians are probably more sensitive than corporations (especially small, transitory
businesses) to reputational injury.  On the other hand, favorable publicity can be critical to corporate
success in a competitive market.
194. Physician malpractice carriers also are flexing their political muscle to protect their business
against incursions by managed care organizations.  See A.B. 3340, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996)
(prohibiting managed care organizations from forcing or inducing physicians to accept malpractice
coverage through them).  The nominal justification for this bill was to ensure physician control over
malpractice settlements, which was equated with physician independence from corporate care
management decisions.
195. See Eugene R. Anderson & Joshua Gold, Are You Covered?, AM. MED. NEWS, Dec. 11, 1995,
at 13.
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pay supplemental malpractice insurance premiums for affiliated physicians as a
cushion against residual liability.  However, such arrangements may be suspect
under federal fraud and abuse laws or the Internal Revenue Code.196
VI
HOPEFUL SIGNS IN TODAY’S ENVIRONMENT
The preceding discussion demonstrates that, for various reasons, the recent
expansion of managed care liability is taking place in a legal and business
environment very different from that envisioned by the proponents of
enterprise liability during the national health care reform debate.  Nonetheless,
one can identify current trends in health law and management that in time may
regenerate some of the legal and market characteristics that made enterprise
liability attractive to policy-makers in 1993.
A.  Amendments to ERISA
As discussed above, ERISA’s uncertain preemptive effect both has
sheltered managed care organizations from legal accountability and has led
courts to reach results in individual cases that do not necessarily comport with
larger issues in health care financing and delivery.197  A necessary step to
improve consistency in malpractice litigation involving health care institutions
therefore is to remedy the imbalances resulting from ERISA.
As previously mentioned, the ERISA statute includes few substantive
provisions governing welfare benefit plans, but does impose fiduciary duties
and reporting requirements on plan sponsors and certain contractors.198
Because of these obligations, an important potential source of liability for both
employers and the managed care organizations with which they do business is
inadequate disclosure of information to beneficiaries.  For example, two recent
cases have held that employee benefit plans and their agents may violate their
fiduciary obligations under § 504(a)(1) of ERISA if they fail to reveal the
financial incentives for cost containment to which their affiliated physicians are
subject.199  Claims are also being brought under ERISA relating to employers’
                                                          
196. Moreover, risks of offending these laws vary according to organizational structure, creating
uneven incentives.  Providing malpractice coverage is more difficult for nonprofit than for for-profit
entities because of charitable purpose restrictions.  It also is more difficult for hospitals than for
insurance organizations because of Medicare kickback concerns.  The IRS recently decided to allow
nonprofit hospitals to provide below-market liability insurance to physicians, but only for a limited
time after recruitment.  See Julie Johnsson, IRS Feeling Charitable on Doctor Recruitment Incentives?,
AM. MED. NEWS, June 23/30, 1997, at 1.
197. See supra notes 108-15.
198. Under recent judicial interpretations of ERISA, beneficiaries may bring breach of fiduciary
duty claims on their own behalf.  See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065 (1996).  Previously, such
actions were permissible only if brought on behalf of the plan, like shareholder derivative suits.
199. See, e.g., Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that failure by HMO to
disclose financial incentives states a claim for breaching fiduciary obligations under ERISA); Drolet v.
Healthsource, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 757 (D.N.H. 1997) (denying motion to dismiss and finding HMO
qualified as fiduciary under ERISA for disclosure purposes).  But see Weiss v. CIGNA Healthcare,
Inc., 972 F. Supp. 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that defendant was not required to disclose financial
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decisionmaking standards as plan sponsors.  In one recent coverage case, a
plan’s summary affirmance of the decision of its administrator insurance
company was overturned by the court because the employer’s ruling was based
on insufficient information.200  In these ways, ERISA can be used to induce
employers to supervise more carefully the actions of the managed care
organizations with which they do business.201
In addition, the Department of Labor (“DOL”), which promulgates
regulations under ERISA, is finally considering setting substantive standards
for employee health plans, possibly including more explicit quality assurance
requirements.  DOL also has filed amicus briefs supporting the proposition that
medical malpractice is not a benefits determination and therefore that
malpractice claims are not preempted by ERISA.202
Finally, Congress is considering several bills that would fill the ERISA
vacuum directly.203  For example, Representative Stark has introduced
legislation to hold ERISA plans liable for medical malpractice if injuries result
from cost-containment practices.204  Taking a different approach,
Representative Norwood has authored comprehensive managed care
legislation that includes a provision amending ERISA’s preemption clause to
exclude preemption of personal injury and wrongful death claims against
insurers or third-party administrators.205  A direct federal remedy is more
likely to produce a consistent view of managed care liability than if it is subject
to different tort law in each of the fifty states, but either approach would free
                                                          
incentives because disclosure obligation belongs to plan administrator, not every fiduciary).  Of course,
even cases allowing claims for inadequate disclosure under ERISA do not provide a meaningful
damage remedy.  See supra text accompanying notes 105-06.
200. See Crocco v. Xerox Corp., 956 F. Supp. 129 (D. Conn. 1997) (finding that employer who
allowed benefits decisions to be made by utilization management company violated ERISA by not
performing a full and fair review of plaintiff’s mental health claim); see also Booton v. Lockheed Med.
Benefit Plan, 110 F.3d 1461, 1464 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that “to deny the claim without explanation
and without obtaining relevant information is an abuse of discretion”).
201. The employer was held responsible in Crocco because the plan document reserved ultimate
discretion to it.  See Crocco, 956 F. Supp. at 137.
202. See DOL Opposes Malpractice Preemption; Legislative Response Appears Unclear, BNA’S
HEALTH L. REP., Apr.  3, 1997, at 503.
203. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-
191, 110 Stat. 1936, also known as the Kassebaum-Kennedy Act, signaled a new willingness on the part
of Congress to regulate ERISA plans directly in federal health care legislation.  Prior to 1995, most
efforts to amend ERISA were mired in the broader politics of labor-management relations.
204. See Managed Care Plan Accountability Act of 1997, H.R. 1749, 105th Cong.
205. See Patient Access to Responsible Care Act of 1997 (PARCA), H.R. 1415, 105th Cong.  In
response to employers’ concerns, and so as not to jeopardize the rest of PARCA should liability
reform fail, Rep. Norwood also has introduced a stand-alone bill, the Responsibility in Managed Care
Act of 1997, H.R. 2960, 105th Cong. (introduced Nov. 8, 1997).  H.R. 2960 eliminates preemption of
claims against persons that provide “insurance or administrative services” to an ERISA plan, but
purports to shield employers by prohibiting indemnification requirements by plans and limiting
employer liability to situations where employers’ exercise of discretionary authority causes injury.  The
Employee Health Insurance Accountability Act of 1997, S. 1136, 105th Cong., submitted by
Representative Durbin, similarly removes malpractice, personal injury, and wrongful death claims
from the scope of preemption.
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courts from the strained reasoning necessary under current law.  However,
business interests have awakened to the litigation and cost implications of
major changes to ERISA preemption, portending a vigorous debate in
Congress.206
B.  New Delivery Systems
As discussed previously, the market has moved away from tightly
integrated, health plans with selective provider panels.207  However, the fact
that health plans currently lack the contours of efficient, liability-bearing
entities as anticipated by enterprise liability theory does not necessarily imply
that managed care organizations will never be suited to that role.
Above all, the market is certain to evolve further.  In particular, many of
the factors alluded to as fostering broad, overlapping networks are likely to
change.  Competition has already reduced excess capacity significantly in some
parts of the country, and eventually it will diminish elsewhere.  This will make
it difficult for health plans to maintain low premiums without engaging in more
specific management practices, many of which will depend on network
selectivity.  At the same time, physicians will feel less pressure to become
affiliated with every health plan, preferring instead to negotiate narrowly in
exchange for assurances of patient volume or other benefits.
Moreover, new organizations may step into the role previously envisioned
for health plans.  In California and a few other regions, large medical groups
are subcontracting with health plans to accept insurance risk for enrolled
populations based on a global capitation amount or a percentage of premium
dollars.208  These groups have many of the attributes that made health plans
theoretically attractive repositories of malpractice liability under managed
competition, as well as other advantages stemming from their physician-
oriented structure and history.
More so than insurance organizations, capitated medical groups profit from
strict medical management, and aspire to a collegial rather than adversarial
relationship with their member physicians.209  By definition, physicians are tied
                                                          
206. See Geri Aston, Liability Provision Could Derail Managed Care Reform, AM. MED. NEWS,
Feb. 9, 1998, at 1, 29.  A major sticking point is whether managed care organizations can be held
accountable without directly subjecting employers to liability.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 163-65.
208. See James C. Robinson & Lawrence P. Casalino, Vertical Integration and Organizational
Networks in Health Care, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1996, at 7.
209. Unlike capitated medical groups, physician practice management companies (“PPMs”) are
uncertain repositories for malpractice liability.  Whereas hospitals that acquire the practices of
affiliated physicians, and even some physician-hospital organizations (“PHOs”), often hope to achieve
a degree of clinical integration, PPMs tend to be large, entrepreneurial organizations primarily
designed to offer sophisticated financial expertise to widely dispersed medical groups.  Although PPMs
are starting to assume responsibility for utilization management and quality assurance, existing
organizations have profited primarily by securitizing physicians’ otherwise illiquid practice assets.  See
James C. Robinson, Consolidation of Medical Groups into Physician Practice Management
Organizations, 279 JAMA 144 (1998); Albert E. Barnett, Protecting Doctor-Patient Relationship in
PPMs Isn’t Easy, AM. MED. NEWS, Feb. 9, 1998, at 17.
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exclusively to the group, so that populations of patients can be aggregated
under the group’s sole responsibility.  Also, medical groups generally employ
their physicians, and can do so without violating laws prohibiting the corporate
practice of medicine.  Thus, in most cases, medical groups already bear
respondeat superior liability for their physicians’ activities.210  Furthermore,
medical groups typically purchase liability insurance as a unit, and many are
large enough to substitute self-insurance or off-shore captive subsidiary
arrangements for commercial coverage.211  Finally, although they lack direct
contractual opportunities at the point of health plan enrollment that could be
used to structure alternative dispute resolution systems, medical groups
frequently offer standardized arbitration agreements to patients at the point of
service.
Another potential home for unified malpractice liability is the disease
management program.212  As managed care moves from price-based bargaining
with surplus providers to clinical cost-containment, and as risk-avoidance
strategies are regulated or competed away, the basic fact that a few chronic
diseases account for the bulk of medical expenditures will take on tremendous
importance.213  Organizations that can provide these patients with high-quality,
cost-effective care through an at-risk subcontract from health plans will be
essential to the continued success of managed care.  While displaying more of a
physician focus than have most insurers, disease management programs usually
will include a greater diversity of non-physician health professionals and a
larger array of affiliations with facilities, pharmaceutical suppliers, and ancillary
service organizations than will capitated medical groups.214  Furthermore,
because the patients they treat are at particularly high risk for medical mishaps,
disease management programs may be effective bearers of malpractice liability
despite their limited impact on the treatment of a health plan’s enrolled
population considered as a whole.
Capitated medical groups and disease management programs will have
added importance in the evolving managed health care system because of the
potential for direct contracting between these entities and employers.  For
example, both types of organization are large enough to allow employers to
                                                          
210. The percentage of physicians practicing as employees rose from 24.2% in 1983 to 45.4% in
1995.  See Employed Physicians, AM. MED. NEWS, Dec. 23/30, 1996, at 2.
211. Unlike insurer- or hospital-sponsored integrated delivery systems, group practices also enjoy
exemptions from federal fraud and abuse laws that make it less problematic to provide malpractice
coverage in a centralized fashion.
212. See Regina E. Herzlinger, MARKET-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES IN THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA’S LARGEST SERVICE INDUSTRY (1997) (discussing “focused
factories” for disease management).
213. See Gray Ellrodt et al., Evidence-Based Disease Management, 278 JAMA 1687 (1997) (stating
that 10% of employees with severe or chronic diseases may consume 70% of a company’s health care
costs).
214. See Greg Borzo, Drug Firms Expand into Patient Care, AM. MED. NEWS, June 24, 1996, at 1,
7-8.  The corporate connection between disease management programs and drug or device
manufacturers also suggests that medical malpractice and product liability claims may become more
closely linked.
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delegate fiduciary obligations to them lawfully and practically under ERISA.
C.  Targeted Regulation
Managed care regulation also may lead to improved quality management at
the health plan level.  State insurance and HMO licensing authorities have
imposed a variety of process-based standards on health plans.  Large employers
and group insurance purchasers are doing the same, as are private accrediting
organizations such as the National Committee for Quality Assurance
(“NCQA”) and the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations (“JCAHO”).215  So too are Medicare and Medicaid.  Ultimately,
it is likely that Medicare will assume a dominant role in the regulation of
managed care.  The Health Care Financing Administration may achieve this
end directly, or may do so by relying on organizations such as NCQA and
JCAHO.
For example, selection and credentialing requirements for health plans now
approach the level of detail traditionally reserved for hospital medical staffs.
This eventually may compel careful oversight of individual physician quality.
Mandatory reporting and disclosure laws based on databases such as HEDIS or
other standardized comparative quality measures may also force health plans to
manage their provider networks more closely.216  Additionally, regulators are
monitoring utilization review, consumer grievance, and dispute resolution
practices for an increasingly broad range of managed care entities, potentially
improving recognition of injury and access to compensation.
D.  Industrial Strategies for Error Reduction
Many aspects of modern industrial society, especially those operating under
time pressure with heavy through-put, have the potential to inflict serious
personal or economic injury.217  Within these “high-reliability industries”—
which range from nuclear power and air transport to banking and mail
carriage—a new science of human factors engineering has arisen.218  By
examining workplace conditions and studying human responses to them, major
                                                          
215. See John K. Iglehart, The National Committee on Quality Assurance, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED.
995 (1996).
216. HEDIS stands for “Health Plan and Employer Data and Information Set.”  See 1997
COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE DATA SOURCEBOOK (John Reichard et al. eds., 1996); William M.
Sage & David Anderson, Health Care Disclosure Requirements, in HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 185-205
(Alice G. Gosfield ed., 1997).
217. For example, litigation over fatigue in work settings is increasing.  See Martin Moore-Ede,
When Things Go Bump in the Night, 81 A.B.A. J., Jan. 1995, at 56.
218. From an industrial perspective, medical quality expectations seem quite low, and medical
malpractice law extremely forgiving.  For example, a 99.9% “error-free” level would mean that 84
unsafe airplane landings occurred each day in the United States, that 16,000 letters were lost each hour
by mail carriers, and that banks made 32,000 check processing errors each hour.  By contrast, the
apparent frequency of inpatient medication errors ranges from 0.2% of drug administrations, if self-
reporting is used for assessment, to 10% if chart review is combined with computerized detection
methods.  See Lucian Leape, Address at the Examining Errors in Health Care Conference (Oct. 13,
1996).
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advances have been made in corporate performance and in consumer, worker,
and public safety.
These processes are being slowly adapted to medicine.  The institutional
rejuvenation needed to meet competitive conditions in managed care has been
accompanied by a new industrial jargon of quality—terms such as “total quality
management” and “process reengineering.”  As one scholar has observed: “The
industrial vision of medicine has brought with it, along with its many adverse
effects … the conceptualization of health care as a collection of processes
interacting within a larger system.”219
Spurred by high-profile tragedies at world famous cancer treatment centers
such as Memorial-Sloan Kettering in New York and Dana Farber in Boston,220
even mainstream medicine is redirecting its approach to error reduction from
individual punishment to institutional prevention.  For example, the American
Medical Association and other sponsors recently established a National Patient
Safety Foundation to fund a multi-year initiative to study process-based safety
in health care.221
E.  Coordinated Risk Management
A final possibility is that malpractice insurers pursuing new business will
generate coordinated quality improvement activities even without formal
arrangements transferring malpractice liability from individuals to institutions.
The lines between physician liability insurers and insurers for institutions such
as hospitals are blurring as new delivery structures in managed care create
competitive opportunities.222  In addition, risk management is now performed
using sophisticated data systems that collect information regionally or
nationally.  Managed care organizations can purchase access to these risk
management databases to assist in tasks such as selecting providers and
developing practice guidelines.
However, there may be limits to innovation in the insurance market.  The
current abundance of insurance capacity for health care—whether malpractice
liability coverage or stop-loss protection for entities bearing health insurance
risk—derives entirely from economic forces external to the health care system.
These include the absence of major insured natural catastrophes since
Hurricane Andrew in 1992, extremely high investment income from stocks,
bonds, and real estate, and the decision to allow corporate participation in
Lloyds of London.  Such favorable circumstances cannot last indefinitely.
                                                          
219. Jerry Avorn, Putting Adverse Drug Events into Perspective, 277 JAMA 341 (1997).
220. See generally Christine Gorman, The Disturbing Case of the Cure That Killed the Patient, TIME,
Apr. 3, 1995, at 60 (describing the death of Boston Globe health columnist Betsy Lehman from a gross
overdose of cancer chemotherapy).
221. See Lisa Belkin, How Can We Save the Next Victim?, N.Y.T. MAG., June 15, 1997, at 28; Janice
Perrone, Designing a Safer, Smarter Health Care System, AM. MED. NEWS, Oct. 27, 1997, at 1, 33;
Linda O. Prager, Reducing Medical Errors, AM. MED. NEWS, Nov. 4, 1996, at 1, 29.
222. The London reinsurance market is playing an important role in this process.  See Paul R.
McGinn, U.S. Physician Coverage a Boon for London Reinsurers, AM. MED. NEWS, Aug. 18, 1997, at
24.
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Future downturns in underwriting and investment cycles may restrict the
availability of innovative forms of pooled or segregated coverage for managed
care organizations much as it did in earlier decades with respect to insurance
for individual physicians.223  In fact—whether the result of external forces, the
potential for expanded liability in managed care, or excessive discounting
accompanying the loss of protected physician markets—malpractice insurers
are already threatening substantial premium increases.224
VII
RESTORING A COHESIVE FRAMEWORK FOR ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
The fundamental objections to enterprise liability as an impetus to quality
improvement in 1993 were twofold: that organizational intrusion in clinical
decisions was always counterproductive, and that malpractice litigation was
unrelated, or at least tangential, to achieving public policy goals.  The former
concern has been rendered moot by the managed care juggernaut.  However,
the latter issue still remains a valid subject for debate.
The potential for enterprise liability to improve managed care ultimately
depends on the underlying utility of malpractice law as a social tool.225
Systematic enterprise liability as proposed during the health care reform debate
arguably could have improved access to compensation, facilitated quality
improvement, and reduced transaction costs.  If current trends in managed care
continue, however, enterprise liability will evolve only piecemeal through
reactive judicial decisions and state legislation.
With respect to compensation, there is little reason to expect improvement
without comprehensive reform, except in the narrow sense that the weakening
of ERISA preemption may provide remedies that did not previously exist.  As
is true for tort litigation generally, however, only a few plaintiffs are likely to
benefit.  By contrast, systematic enterprise liability proposals rely on a
combination of regulatory oversight, alternative dispute resolution, and limits
on litigation exposure to ensure that more grievances relating to injury are
aired while controlling the costs of resolving them.  Absent such measures,
managed care entities will be reluctant to acknowledge their clinical
responsibilities without a fight.
Neither is the deterrent effect of medical malpractice law certain to be
furthered by current trends in managed care liability, especially without some
mechanism to bring a larger percentage of adverse events to dispute resolution.
The vagaries of ERISA, the non-selective character of current managed care
networks, and the continued fixation on individual physician accountability all
tend to perpetuate the small numbers problem of litigation correlating poorly
                                                          
223. On the other hand, the eventual public securitization of insurance may increase underwriting
capacity to an even greater degree.
224. See Linda O. Prager, Market Upheaval Threatens Liability Rate Hikes, AM. MED. NEWS, Feb.
16, 1997, at 1, 33.
225. See THE URBAN INSTITUTE, supra note 13, at 28.
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with demonstrable quality.  Furthermore, patchwork imposition of potentially
crippling liability may deter innovation in health care delivery and
inadvertently channel managed care into less efficient, lower quality forms of
organization.
In addition, the tort reform climate in many states limits the usefulness of
private arrangements to redistribute liability in managed care systems.226
Without caps on non-economic damages or clearly permissible forms of
structured dispute resolution, any health plan that individually offers enterprise
liability to its network physicians may find itself at a competitive disadvantage
compared to other plans in its area that do not assume liability.  At the same
time, the uncertain integrity of the ERISA shield may discourage contractual
reapportionment of liability between seemingly protected and seemingly
unprotected parties.
There are also reasons to be concerned about the cost of managed care
liability as it is developing.  Both legislation creating new causes of action and
the fragmentation of managed care networks discourage a major theoretical
advantage of systematic enterprise liability: the ability to establish a contractual
alternative to traditional litigation.  Moreover, despite its beneficial effect on
compensation for injured plaintiffs, the filling of the ERISA vacuum—either by
judicial decisions weakening preemption or by changes to ERISA itself—
carries with it potentially high transaction costs.227  In addition, unlike
systematic enterprise liability, which consolidates claims in a two-party action,
legislation or case law allowing suits to be brought against additional parties
increases strategic behavior by plaintiffs and finger-pointing among
defendants.228
The best solution to these problems is to enact federal legislation that
creates a uniform, national approach to personal injury litigation arising from
medical care.  Federal intervention is both inevitable and desirable.  It is
inevitable because, no matter how courts finesse ERISA preemption to
accommodate equities of particular cases, there is no principled way to
                                                          
226. Not only have some state legislatures opposed tort reform, but several state constitutions have
been interpreted as prohibiting limits on damages.  See, e.g., Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, Nos. 81890-
81893, 1997 Ill. LEXIS 478 (Ill. Dec. 18, 1997) (striking down Illinois’ Civil Justice Reform
Amendments of 1995, including a $500,000 cap on non-economic damages).
227. The cost implications of expanded liability are speculative, as indeed are the costs of the
current malpractice system.  In 1991, malpractice insurance premiums and self-funded reserves totaled
$9 billion, in itself a large sum but only about 1% of total health care spending.  See THE URBAN
INSTITUTE, supra note 227, at 8.  “Defensive medicine” is arguably much greater, but includes
necessary interventions as well as wasteful ones.  See Kessler & McClellan, supra note 9.  In any event,
it seems safe to assume that greater liability means higher administrative cost, which will be passed on
to health plan sponsors and beneficiaries in the same way that fee-for-service malpractice costs are
ultimately borne by patients.
228. One exception to this is the Dukes trend of allowing claims only for vicarious liability.  Since
the managed care organization’s liability is derivative of the liability of the physician or the hospital,
there is less incentive for each to point the finger at the other, especially because managed care
organizations held vicariously liable could bring contribution claims against insured physicians.  With
direct claims like Corcoran, on the other hand, there frequently will be incentives for physicians to
testify against managed care organizations in exchange for being dropped (or never named) as
defendants.  The lack of cohesiveness of managed care networks encourages these maneuvers.
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distinguish benefit determinations from treatment decisions in managed care.
Consequently, injured patients cannot obtain fair and equitable compensation
absent federal legislation.
A federal approach is desirable because we will have a rational, accessible
system offering cost-effective, population-based health management only if we
encourage clinical and managerial innovation to create it.  This implies
ensuring equal risk and opportunity for managed care enterprises rather than
enforcing liability rules that arbitrarily favor certain organizational forms over
others.  It also means adopting inclusive strategies for dispute resolution that
serve patient populations broadly rather than offering windfalls to privileged
winners in a litigation lottery.  Neither of these goals will be achieved as long as
legal rights and remedies depend on outdated or artificial distinctions that fail
to acknowledge the increasing diversity of health care organizations and the
very high expectations society puts upon them.
Federalizing managed care liability makes sense whether or not the United
States ever reaches national consensus regarding a health care entitlement.  In
the absence of comprehensive health reform, the current link between private
employment and health insurance will almost certainly stand as a second-best
solution.229  In that event, maintaining uniform liability rules under ERISA for
multistate businesses and the managed care organizations that serve them is
likely to improve access and reduce costs at the margin.  At the same time, the
Health Care Financing Administration is rapidly becoming the principal
regulator of managed care as the percentage of Medicare beneficiaries in
prepaid health plans rises.230  Furthermore, the federal government is already
policing managed care quality through a variety of enforcement mechanisms
tied to personal injury.231
If federal legislation involving managed care liability is proposed, it should
be measured against the following principles:
 
(1) An ideal law would grant all plaintiffs equal rights and remedies,
                                                          
229. The future of employer-based health care is a subject of considerable debate.  One important
issue with implications for liability is whether employers continue to sponsor defined-benefit plans that
assure workers of medically necessary care, or whether they elect to shift the risks of adverse selection
and medical inflation to other parties by limiting their financial responsibility to a defined dollar
contribution (perhaps using a medical savings account).  Only in the former situation would employers
maintain close enough ties to health care delivery to warrant imposition of liability.
230. This is an example of history repeating itself.  Medicare fee-for-service reimbursement policies
largely determine the structure and conduct of the health care industry, despite the supposed primacy
of state laws governing professional licensure and insurance.  Moreover, the Balanced Budget Act of
1997 (“BBA”) radically altered Medicare managed care, enacting a Medicare+Choice program that
presupposes an increasing diversity of organizational structures to finance and deliver managed care
services.  See Pub. L. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997).  Medicare and Medicaid also have become the
primary vehicles for expanding health coverage to children under the BBA and to early retirees if
more recent legislative proposals are enacted.
231. In addition to private suits under EMTALA, federal prosecutors are beginning to bring actions
against plans and providers under the False Claims Act and other antifraud statutes for failing to
provide adequate care to Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries.  See Kristen Hallam, Bragging Rights:
Report Shows Fraud Probes Are Paying Big Dividends, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Feb. 2, 1998, at 8.
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regardless of the public or employer sponsorship of the defendant
managed care organization.
 
(2) An ideal law would include regulatory oversight to promote broad
patient access to cooperative dispute resolution and timely
compensation.
 
(3) An ideal law would constrain damages to amounts necessary to
provide adequate compensation and quality improvement
incentives, without deterring innovation.
 
(4) An ideal law would permit reasonable, private contractual
modifications to liability and dispute resolution by patients,
providers, health insurers and/or plan sponsors.
 
(5) An ideal law would encourage voluntary error reporting and
internal institutional quality improvement.
 
(6) An ideal law would not favor certain organizational structures or
forms of care management over others.
What specific changes might be warranted?  Above all, the uneven effects
of ERISA preemption are both logically and ethically indefensible.  Moreover,
line-drawing in a rapidly changing industry is practically impossible.  Congress
therefore should create uniform rights and remedies for personal injury claims
(both malpractice allegations and coverage denials) arising from medical care.
These would apply equally to insured ERISA plans, self-funded ERISA plan
administrators, commercial insurers and HMOs, and any entity certified to
participate in Medicare+Choice,232 as well as to individual health professionals,
provider organizations, and subcontractors for ancillary services.233
To avoid placing the entire managed care industry on trial every time a
mishap occurs, liability should be premised on actual causation of injury or
vicarious responsibility therefor, paralleling traditional medical malpractice
causes of action.  Tangential claims—such as allegations of breach of fiduciary
duty, bad faith breach of contract, or infliction of emotional distress—should be
preempted or, if brought under ERISA or other federal statutes, strictly
                                                          
232. The eligibility of Provider-Sponsored Organizations (“PSOs”) to participate in
Medicare+Choice confirms the absurdity of ERISA’s current distinction between benefit
determinations and treatment decisions.  The reason for allowing PSOs was to encourage physicians to
form and manage health plans.
233. An important detail to address is the division of responsibility between state and federal
courts.  A difference between adding substantive force to ERISA and removing personal injury claims
from preemption is that the former could greatly increase the workload of federal courts while the
latter (diversity jurisdiction aside) might decrease it.
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limited.234  In addition, liability based on financial incentives in managed care
contracts should be constrained, on the theory that regulatory bodies will
adequately address such provisions through substantive prohibitions and
disclosure obligations.235
Similarly, damage awards should be geared to achieving clear public policy
objectives, not venting popular disaffection with managed care.  Because
compensatory damages are the norm in medical malpractice litigation against
individual physician defendants, and generally provide adequate recovery for
injured patients (and their attorneys), punitive damages should be prohibited
except in cases of willful harm.236  This would make liability exposure more
predictable for managed care organizations and therefore easier to insure or
self-insure.
Other refinements also could improve access to compensation, facilitate
quality improvement, and reduce administrative costs.  For example, Congress
should build on current Medicare regulations to create a uniform process—
applicable both to benefits determinations and to instances of alleged
malpractice—for airing grievances, appealing care management decisions, and
resolving disputes over alleged injury.  This process might be exclusive, or
might co-exist with state laws governing alternative dispute resolution.237
Federal law also should protect legitimate organizational quality improvement
activities from private litigants by guaranteeing substantive immunity under
certain circumstances and by enacting liberal procedural rules that ensure
confidentiality and non-discoverability.238  Finally, all potential defendants
should be required to carry adequate malpractice insurance or comply with
solvency safeguards, while existing laws such as anti-kickback regulations and
tax code provisions that discourage health care organizations from providing
liability coverage to affiliated physicians should be amended.
VIII
CONCLUSION
Since the failure of national health care reform, the terms of the debate
over enterprise liability have changed.  In 1993, the challenge was to
                                                          
234. Among other things, this generally would shield employers and other plan sponsors from
liability unless they were involved very closely in clinical decisions.
235. This would have the beneficial effect of rewarding health plans that delegate care decisions to
providers and provider groups.  It also would reverse current law, which tends to encourage rule-based
benefit decisions that are protected most clearly by ERISA preemption.  One should note that judges
already have considerable discretion to circumscribe legal claims through evidentiary rulings.
Evidence regarding financial incentives, while sometimes relevant, tends to be so prejudicial that
courts might be justified in deeming it inadmissible.
236. Furthermore, attorneys’ fees presently are available to prevailing plaintiffs under ERISA, and
should continue to be.
237. If state participation is desired, Congress should reverse Casarotto’s interpretation of the
Federal Arbitration Act.  See supra text accompanying notes 160-61.
238. Cf. Health Care Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11101 (1994) (providing for immunity
from antitrust liability for peer review activity).
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reinvigorate a stagnant malpractice system that barely was aware of the nascent
managed care industry.  Now the challenge is to make sense of, and bring
discipline to, liability laws that are straining to assert control over a rapidly
expanding competitive marketplace.  This article has argued that federal
legislation is needed to level the playing field among different types of health
plans and providers, and to create a malpractice system that performs better in
managed care than it has in fee-for-service medicine.
As in 1993, of course, this will be an uphill political fight.  A promising sign
is that each constituency has something to gain from compromise, both in
maintaining its own coalition and in reaching agreement with opposing parties.
For example, consumers and trial lawyers can loosen ERISA preemption, but
must accommodate physicians’ concerns about unbridled liability.  Similarly,
insurers can protect themselves from jury outrage, but must accept a stronger
regulatory framework for treatment decisions and redress of injury.
Furthermore, it remains possible that systematic forms of enterprise
liability that incorporate measures to improve the compensatory and deterrent
effects, as well as the administrative efficiency, of tort law will be tested.  The
Physician Payment Review Commission and the American College of
Physicians have endorsed federal support for demonstration projects and for
the evaluation of existing examples of enterprise liability.239  More recently, the
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation funded a demonstration of enterprise
liability in combination with other malpractice reforms in Utah.240
To summarize, the current movement toward managed care liability is an
important trend with implications for both the cost and quality of American
health care.  Most significantly, it signals a new recognition of the ethical and
legal responsibilities of health care institutions in the modern era.  Eventually,
this sentiment may erode the preconceptions about accountability in health
care that continue to impair the integration of medical malpractice law with the
industrial foundation and regulatory framework of our managed health care
system.  Without a careful, coordinated approach, however, the attribution of
liability to managed care organizations will not realize its full potential to
improve the performance of the tort system or the health care system in cases
of medical error.
                                                          
239. See PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REV. COMM’N, 1995 REPORT TO CONGRESS 317-18, 327-28 (1995);
1994 PPRC REPORT, supra note 63, at 289-90, 299-300; American College of Physicians, Beyond
MICRA: New Ideas for Liability Reform, 122 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 466, 470-71 (1995).  The final
version of the Clinton Administration’s proposed Health Security Act similarly called for state-based
demonstration projects of enterprise liability.  See Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103rd Cong. § 5311
(1994).
240. See S. Keith Petersen, No-Fault and Enterprise Liability: The View From Utah, 122 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 462 (1995); Utah Seeks Test of Enterprise Liability, MED. LIABILITY MONITOR, Dec.
13, 1994, at 1.
